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Abstract 
This master thesis examines the strategic responses of Berlin Humboldt University to the 
German policy instrument Excellence Initiative. Using document analysis and qualitative 
interviews, it investigates which changes have been taking place within the university and 
whether they can be interpreted as strategic responses to the policy instrument. Furthermore, 
it addresses the question to what extent the changes have been triggered by the institutional 
leadership and in which way they are being influenced by institutional forces. The analysis is 
based on Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic responses and characterization of 
environmental pressures. The findings indicate that several organizational changes took place 
that can be considered strategic responses to the Excellence Initiative. A large part of the 
strategic behavior was deliberately triggered by the institutional leadership but several 
changes also emerged from within the institution. This means the university can be considered 
a strategic actor that is able to act strategically within the boundaries of its institutional norms. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis analyzes the strategic responses of Berlin Humboldt University to the German 
Excellence Initiative which is a governmental policy instrument intended to advance excellent 
research and international visibility of German universities by promoting organizational 
strategies (BAnz, 2005). Using an empirical case study, it will be investigated which changes 
have been taking place within the university and whether they can be interpreted as strategic 
responses to the policy instrument.  
The reasons why this research is relevant are threefold: First, by investigating whether 
organizational changes have been strategically triggered by leadership or whether they have 
emerged from within the institution, this thesis contributes to the understanding of strategic 
behavior in universities. Exploring the topic by using an empirical approach is particularly 
interesting as there has been only little research done on strategic behavior in universities so 
far (Fumasoli & Lepori, 2011; Hazelkorn, 2009; Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Second, this thesis 
provides insights into how policy instruments influence organizational change and strategic 
behavior by investigating the changes within Berlin Humboldt University that took place after 
the implementation of the Excellence Initiative. This contributes to the empirical research on 
the outcomes of the recent reforms that have been taking place in European universities  
(Gornitzka, Maassen, Olsen, & Stensaker, 2007). Finally, by using the case of a highly 
institutionalized university such as Berlin Humboldt University, it can be expected to get 
interesting insights into how institutional forces influence the outcomes of the intended 
changes, thereby addressing the question to what extent strategic behavior is possible in 
higher education institutions (Fumasoli, Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2012). 
1.1 Strategic behavior and organizational 
change 
In order to understand strategic behavior, it is important to explain how it is related to 
organizational change. Organizational change describes any kind of change that is taking 
place within a university. On the one hand, it can emerge from within the institution without 
being strategically planned. On the other hand, organizational change can also be triggered by 
an identifiable group of actors, in which case it can be considered as strategic behavior 
(Gornitzka et al., 2007). Based on these assumptions, strategic behavior can be studied by 
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investigating organizational changes and by examining whether these changes have been 
triggered by certain actors or whether they have incrementally emerged without strategic 
intention. Considering that strategic behavior is a form of organizational change, it is 
therefore important to take a closer look at the literature on organizational change as a starting 
point.  
1.1.1 Changing dynamics in universities 
Organizational change has always been part of the institutional dynamics of universities 
throughout the 900 years of their existence. However, speed and magnitude of change seem to 
have increased greatly during the last decades (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). The starting 
point of those accelerated change dynamics lays in the late 1960s, when higher education 
systems began to grow at a large scale. While the university seemed to be in little need of 
change during the preceding period of economic growth of the 1950s and early 1960s, 
massification and the financial constraints it brought along began to undermine the legitimacy 
of the university’s purpose and function (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). Paradeise, Reale, and 
Goastellec (2009) have argued that the beneficial contribution of universities to society by 
spreading knowledge and education remained unquestioned by public authorities and the 
general public as long as higher education was only accessible for a small elite. Only with the 
opening up to the broader public and the increasing scarcity of public money did the voices 
who demanded a rethinking of the university’s purpose start to get louder.  
Against this background many experts suggest that we still remain in a „critical period“ with a 
potential for radical change especially with regard to the balance of authority and power in 
university governance (Gornitzka et al., 2007). This assumption is supported by the 
observation of several fundamental changes that have been taking place in almost all parts of 
the university, including the core areas of academic freedom, the way universities and whole 
systems are organized and the degree to what institutions are granted autonomy (Olsen, 
2007). While some of those changes are being initiated by reforms, some are emerging 
incrementally, seemingly without any particular goal. 
Such times of radical change offer a valuable opportunity to take a closer look at how 
universities work and how they are organized, Moreover, it can help identify possible 
outcomes of the change that is currently taking place (Olsen, 2007). More empirical research 
on organizational change is especially important considering the difficulties many researchers 
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have experienced when trying to predict reliably under which conditions radical or 
incremental change is likely to take place and what impact it is actually going to have 
(Gornitzka et al., 2007).  Berlin Humboldt University being a good example of a university 
having faced several reform attempts lately, it will give interesting insights into what kind of 
organizational change is taking place within the university and whether those changes can be 
considered strategic responses to the changes in the environment.    
1.1.2 Changing environment of universities 
In order to understand why changes are taking place within universities, it is necessary to 
discuss the developments in the institutional environment that are leading to these increased 
change dynamics. The main driver of change in universities is their need to adapt to the 
environment in order to survive (Olsen & Maassen, 2007). One major change has been taking 
place in the expectations society has of universities. Today in Western Europe universities are 
generally regarded as core knowledge institutions which play a major role in their country’s 
‚knowledge-based economy‘. They are perceived as producers and diffusers of knowledge for 
the sake of national and regional innovation and economic performance (Paradeise et al., 
2009). Following the idea that a country’s economic well-being is increasingly resting on 
knowledge and innovation, universities have therefore gained a more prominent position both 
in politics and the general public over the last decades (Paradeise et al., 2009). This brings 
about many expectations for higher education institutions, such as catering for the fast-
growing demand for high-level skilled workers and research-based commercial technologies 
(Olsen & Maassen, 2007). At the same time universities are facing the challenges of the on-
going diversification and massification of the higher education system (Enders, 2006). The 
need to change is further increased by the financial constraints most higher education 
institutions are facing due to the steady decrease of per capita public investment in higher 
education in most European countries (Paradeise et al., 2009). 
More often than not, universities in Europe are seen as incapable of meeting societal demands 
with stark contrast to their main competitors in the US and Asia (Olsen & Maassen, 2007). 
Many claim that European universities are not adapting quickly enough, arguing that more 
fundamental changes will be necessary, i.e. that universities as such need to rethink their role 
in society and reshape the way they are organized (Olsen & Maassen, 2007). The inertia of 
change within universities can be explained by certain characteristics of higher education 
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systems that affect the ability and capacity to change. Higher education systems in most 
European countries are highly institutionalized with high levels of bureaucratization and 
professionalization which entail various constraints upon change (Clark, 1986). Moreover, 
because universities are bottom-heavy professional bureaucracies, most decision-making 
responsibilities lie with professional experts and are therefore highly fragmented. This makes 
the coordination of change a difficult and laborious task (Mintzberg, 1979). Especially in 
Europe, where there has been a tradition of oligarchical forms of authority in higher education 
systems, this tends to constrain the pace and depth of change, as “guildlike groups guard 
local, fragmented guild territories” (Clark, 1986). 
1.1.3 Organizational change through reforms 
Several higher education reforms in Europe have attempted to influence the factors that seem 
to hamper the success of European universities in the global competition. In general, the 
solution for the gap between rising demands and performance is mostly seen in the 
reorganization of the national systems of higher education with the aim of making the system 
perform better and adapt more quickly, while at the same time lowering its costs (Paradeise et 
al., 2009). Many reforms entail policy instruments that are aimed at initiating organizational 
change within universities, as is the case with the German Excellence Initiative. By providing 
incentives to universities for developing an organizational strategy, it aims at advancing 
strategic behavior.  
However, Excellence Initiative is only one of several policy instruments in the German higher 
education sector. Like in many European countries, most higher education reforms are part of 
overarching reforms of the public sector which have been affected by the idea that 
productivity and quality could be best improved by transforming the public bureaucracy by 
means of New Public Management (Paradeise et al., 2009). With regard to higher education 
institutions, this includes the reorganization of the universities’ organizational and financial 
basis according to this new organizational paradigm, rebalancing their governance structures 
and rethinking who should be the main actors influencing the future dynamics of the 
institution (Olsen & Maassen, 2007). According to this view, universities should become 
more autonomous and governments should interfere less, the reason being that universities 
themselves know best what is needed in order to fulfill their mission. It is believed that state 
interference tends to reduce performance and competitiveness and government steering 
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should only take place at arm’s length and mainly through accountability mechanisms (Olsen 
& Maassen, 2007). One implication of the increased institutional autonomy is the idea of a 
strong, unitary and professional institutional leadership, which is supposed to enhance the 
universities’ strategic capabilities to manage their available resources and to approach their 
challenges in a more centralized manner. In general this belief is paired with the assumption 
that it is important to establish more determined university strategies (Olsen & Maassen, 
2007).  In line with the demands for increased societal relevance, the above assumptions 
generally lead to the expectation that to the extent that universities gain greater autonomy they 
are to respond more to the needs of society, including industry and business. This belief is 
reflected for example in the trend of including more and more external stakeholders in the 
governing bodies of universities (Olsen & Maassen, 2007). 
One thing that should be kept in mind when investigating reforms and policy instruments is 
that there is no global and stable meaning of the concept of quality. In fact, the causal chains 
between formal structures, university practices and actual performance are usually indirect, 
long and complex (Olsen, 2007). Even though empirical evidence indicates that there is no 
straight causal line from the intentions of identifiable actors to university performance, 
European policy makers nonetheless often act on the assumption of environmental 
determinism in order to justify their reform attempts (Gornitzka et al., 2007). However, past 
observation shows that changes in environment, for example during industrial, democratic 
and scientific revolutions, might have influenced but never determined university dynamics 
(Olsen, 2007). At the same time, it has been shown that no single actor or coherent group of 
actors is likely to have full control over the process and outcomes of the reforms (Gornitzka et 
al., 2007). In general, opinions with respect to the degree to which universities can be 
reformed through deliberate intervention depend on the extent to which institutions are seen 
as autonomous actors independent of environmental stability and change (March & Olsen, 
1984).  
Those considerations call for further investigation of the organizational changes that have 
taken place in the context of recent higher education reforms. Of particular interest is the 
change in strategic behavior and how this change is related to the policy instrument 
Excellence Initiative. Thereby this study will not only shed more light on strategic behavior 
within universities, but will also contribute to the debate to what extent reform outcomes are 
influenced by institutional forces. 
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1.2 Universities as strategic actors 
As mentioned above, many recent reform efforts are based on the assumption that universities 
need to be given enough autonomy in order to be able to make strategic choices within their 
environment (Gornitzka et al., 2007). Underlying those reforms is the emerging idea of 
universities as strategic actors. This means that universities are perceived as integrated, goal-
oriented organizations deliberately choosing their own actions and capable of being held 
responsible for them (Krücken & Meier, 2006). This idea differs greatly from the traditional 
conception of universities not being important decision-making entities in their own right, 
which is related to the fact that universities in continental Europe are traditionally considered 
to be loosely coupled professional bureaucracies with a weak institutional level (Paradeise et 
al., 2009). In Germany, this tradition is reflected in the dual leadership structure of many 
universities, in which administratively appointed staff share the floor with elected academic 
leaders, whereas both sides have had little strategic leadership capacity (Paradeise et al., 
2009). Rather than acting like a chief executive of a large organization, a rector is considered 
a primus inter pares acting as an institutional integrator among colleagues and using status 
resources rather than functional position to lend legitimacy to university decisions. Instead, 
the decisions are really taken by the faculty, often in direct interaction with the Ministry and 
ratified by the executive board (Paradeise et al., 2009). However, due to recent reforms 
institutional leadership of German universities is being increasingly professionalized and 
centralized, thereby gaining capabilities to act strategically.  
1.2.1 Rise of the notion of organizational strategy 
Parallel to the strengthened institutional leadership a rise of the notion of organizational 
strategy has taken place in German higher education. This can be explained by several 
reasons. First, the increased degree of institutional autonomy and the decreased level of state 
control over higher education institutions increasingly require the universities to define their 
position in the system (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007; Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008). 
Suddenly universities are responsible for defining their own legitimate goals, instead of only 
responding to externally imposed tasks or assigned societal functions (Krücken & Meier, 
2006). Second, in several countries governments advocating New Public Management have 
asked universities to provide planning, often in form of a concrete strategy document 
(Maassen & Potman, 1990). Finally, higher education institutions are under pressure to 
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differentiate by strategically constructing their portfolios (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007). 
Fumasoli and Lepori (2011) have introduced the term ‘institutional positioning’ for this 
process. Fumasoli and Huisman (2013) have further conceptualized this process along the 
following two dimensions. Along the first dimension, institutional positioning takes place as 
an outcome of deliberate actions as well as emerging from environmental influences. The 
second dimension describes whether the institution positions itself by showing compliance to 
the environmental pressures or whether it is emphasizing differences from competitors in 
order to elude competition. Each institution can be located along those two axes and the 
position it takes is considered its so-called niche within the higher education system. This 
positioning process is accelerated by the growing demands of an increasingly diversified 
society, which expects its universities to adjust their educational and research activities 
accordingly (Teichler, 2008). At the same time the process is actively encouraged by explicit 
government policies such as Excellence Initiative, which is aiming to create competition 
among universities, which forces the institutions to develop a strategic profile (Bonaccorsi & 
Daraio, 2007).  
1.2.2 Conceptualizing organizational strategies 
It is important to outline what is meant by organizational strategy in this thesis. Following the 
definition by Fumasoli and Lepori (2011, p. 3), a strategy is conceived as 
„a pattern of decisions and actions aiming at realizing objectives that are relevant for the 
organization and which compose a coherent sequence developing in time and across 
relevant areas of activity. To be identified as a strategy, such patterns must be recognized 
and shared by organizational members as a collective pursuit of organizational goals. 
Actors’ rationalization of a pattern as an organizational strategy can occur before 
decisions and actions take place (as in strategy formulation, for example in the strategic 
plan), meanwhile or afterwards, as actors rationalize organizational events in a strategic 
perspective.“ 
Organizational strategies can be considered instruments that help universities manage their 
organizational processes and deal with their environments with the goal of selecting a 
portfolio of activities and finding an appropriate position in the higher education system 
(Fumasoli & Lepori, 2011). However, it is interesting to mention Mintzberg’s (2007) 
argument that the positive return on investment in strategizing is not always apparent because 
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the ‘strategic’ method of formalized planning is often less informed by evidence and therefore 
rather risky. This is especially the case when strategizing takes place in isolation from the 
normal ‘chaotic’ flow of information and decisions within an organization. Leslie (1996) 
suggests that the idea that structure and process in a university can be rationally designed for 
results is outdated. Mintzberg (2007) concludes that organizational strategies should be 
understood as a pattern emerging while the organization is engaging in somewhat 
opportunistic transactions with a continuously changing environment. 
Similarly some have proposed the idea that strategies in universities are of an interpretive 
nature, which means that through those strategies the organizational representatives can 
convey meaning that is intended to motivate stakeholders to act in a favorable way for the 
organization. This idea makes it easier to explain how organizational strategies work within 
universities, given that the traditional adaptive model entails that organizations change mainly 
in order to be aligned with consumer preferences, a model that is difficult to apply to loosely 
coupled system like universities (Maassen & Potman, 1990) . 
1.2.3 Organizational strategy – a controversial topic 
Even though the notion of organizational strategy has spread widely in European higher 
education, the issue is controversial within the research literature. One reason for this is a 
wide-spread skepticism that it might be inappropriate to consider higher education institutions 
as strategic units which perform deliberate strategic actions in the sense of the definition 
above. From the very beginning, authors have expressed doubts about the applicability of a 
business concept such as strategic planning to a highly institutionalized organization like a 
university and in fact many expected the concept to gradually disappear over time (Maassen 
& Potman, 1990).  
The arguments for this skepticism are threefold. First, the institutional approach sees 
universities as old and slowly evolving organizations whose essential institutional nature 
hinders strategy (Fumasoli & Lepori, 2011). As stated by Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2007) 
„universities bring with them the ‘iron cage’ of their historical origin and follow largely 
institutionalized and general rules that strongly limit the scope for discretionary behavior“. 
Because universities are inclined to follow these rules, they must be responsive to external 
stakeholders such as scientific communities, which doesn’t leave much room for strategic 
deliberation (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007). This could explain why university strategies and 
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mission statements are often considered organizational window dressing and in a way being 
rather detached from day-to-day decision making (Krücken & Meier, 2006). However, the 
elements of such ‘front stage’ statements could be seen as globally institutionalized scripts of 
what the university is expected to be (Krücken & Meier, 2006). 
A second argument against the strategic capabilities of universities is based on the simple fact 
that most European universities are public institutions with no large endowments and no 
ability to borrow money at the financial market, making them very dependent on public 
funding. As the ability to make decisions about the amount of collected resources that are then 
allocated to strategic objectives is a fundamental condition of strategic behavior and, in the 
case of European universities, resources are mostly allocated outside the reach of their power, 
one must conclude that the notion of strategic behavior cannot be applied to public higher 
education institutions (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007). It can be argued that this contradiction is 
caused by the problematic direct translation of the term ‘strategy’, which is originally coming 
from the business sector, into the public realm of higher education (Amaral, Jones, & Karseth, 
2002). Similarly, Whitley (2008) points out that the development of strategic autonomy 
within universities depends highly on the availability of resources from a variety of different 
agencies, activities and in particular from commercialization revenues. 
The third and final argument against the view of universities as strategic units derives from 
the common idea of higher education institutions as loosely coupled organizations (Weick, 
1976). According to this theory decentralized structures and the unclear and ambiguous 
technology in such organizations render strategy at the organizational level organizations 
difficult (Musselin, 2007). This can be explained by the strong autonomy and self-regulation 
the professional staff has in the decision making process and the execution of their tasks 
(Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007). Moreover, authority is divided into a formal line, which 
comprises mainly financial and administrative matters, and an academic line, which is based 
on reputation and professional competence and is relatively independent from the former. In 
addition, the subunits of such organizations are also relatively independent from each other in 
the pursuit of their targets. Resources are generally distributed according to predefined rules 
without any precondition of defining priorities (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2007). Mintzberg 
(1979) has termed this kind of loosely coupled organization ‘professional bureaucracy’. 
Under these circumstances the idea of deliberate strategic planning is difficult to maintain, 
because such planning would require researchers to share their intellectual goals, knowledge 
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and resources in the joint pursuit of organizational objectives, as opposed to pursuing mainly 
the objectives of their individual research group or their discipline (Whitley, 2008). The 
dominant role of scientific communities in establishing research priorities and merit criteria 
limits the ability of universities to coordinate and determine the direction of their research 
activities (Whitley, 2008). In fact, Whitley (2008) argues that universities are becoming more 
similar to portfolio managers, who decide to make strategic investments in particular project 
teams instead of genuinely being strategic actors in control of the actual research and teaching 
activities. Leslie (1996) goes so far as to claim that universities are very unlikely to have 
enough centralized intelligence or information that would be needed to impose effective 
standardized strategies on their organizational units. On the contrary, he sees the strength of 
such loosely coupled systems in the collective and independent intelligence of their 
constituent parts. 
Considering the controversial nature of the subject of strategic behavior in higher education 
institutions, it is therefore interesting to contribute an empirical case study to the topic. 
Examining the organizational changes in Berlin Humboldt University that followed the 
implementation of the Excellence Initiative will contribute to the question, if strategic 
behavior is possible in universities or whether those changes have emerged from within the 
institution instead.   
1.3 Excellence Initiative and strategic behavior 
Focus of this study is the strategic behavior in Berlin Humboldt University that might have 
taken place after the implementation of the policy instrument Excellence Initiative. This 
instrument aimed at promoting cutting-edge research and creating outstanding conditions for 
researchers at German universities by a competitive grant provided by the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and the sixteen State Governments (BAnz, 2005). It has been initiated 
in 2005 and distributed in total € 4,3 billion via three lines of funding: Excellent Graduate 
Schools, Clusters of Excellence and Institutional Strategies (DFG, 2012). In the first two 
funding lines German universities could apply by providing a proposal for interdisciplinary 
research clusters or graduate schools respectively. Funding was granted based on the 
evaluation by a review panel of international academics. In the third funding line, money was 
granted for so-called Institutional Strategies, i.e. universities were asked to apply with a 
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university-wide strategy of how to develop its structures and processes in order to provide 
conditions for excellent research. 
1.3.1 Objectives of Excellence Initiative 
One of the Excellence Initiative’s main objectives being the promotion of institutional 
strategies in universities, this policy instrument makes a particularly insightful case for 
examining organizational change within universities that can be interpreted as strategic 
behavior. Its official main rationale is to make German universities more competitive and 
internationally visible (Exzellenzinitiative, 2008). On the one hand this is pursued by 
promoting excellent research via the funding lines Clusters of Excellence and Graduate 
Schools, on the other hand the funding line Institutional Strategies is aimed at initiating 
organizational change within the universities and increasing their strategic behavior. 
Moreover, the Institutional Strategy is supposed to help reduce the fragmentation within the 
institutions and to strengthen the university leadership (Gaehtgens, 2010). Another argument 
for combining project-based funding of clusters and graduate schools on the one hand and 
university-wide funding of an Institutional Strategy on the other was based on the observation 
that research clusters and schools were generally more successful when integrated into an 
overall university strategy (Gaehtgens, 2010). By granting additional money through the 
Institutional Strategies it became easier for the universities to make strategic decisions, which 
sometimes includes making risky choices which in case of failure might lead to negative 
financial consequences (Schreiterer, 2010). In general the funding line of the Institutional 
Strategy is said to reflect the fact that the strengthening of the strategic capabilities of higher 
education institutions is considered as a central goal that is shared by all stakeholders of the 
German higher education sector (Gaehtgens, 2010). As stated by the German University 
Rectors Conference, the „international competitiveness of German higher education 
institutions is to a considerable amount determined by their ability to organize planning 
processes, performance based budget allocation and internal governance in an efficient way“ 
(HRK, 2005; translated by the author).  
By encouraging higher education institutions to position themselves more strategically in the 
system, the Excellence Initiative aimed at advancing the institutional differentiation of the 
whole German higher education system in general, both horizontally and vertically (Meyer, 
2010). According to Hazelkorn (2009), the Excellence Initiative can in a way be seen as a 
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ranking instrument which advances the reputational and thereby vertical differentiation 
among German universities. She emphasizes that every German university has been affected 
by this new differentiation paradigm, even those which might have previously been sheltered 
by their history, mission or governance (Hazelkorn, 2009). Albrecht (2013) argues that the 
Excellence Initiative  is not only aimed at structural change of German higher education 
institutions, but also at a more general cultural change within the German higher education 
system. In the same vein, some authors speak of a fundamental paradigm change within the 
German higher education system which was initiated or at least advanced by the Excellence 
Initiative. Despite the fact that the Humboldtian idea of egality had so far always been 
predominant in the German system, in recent times more and more voices have begun to 
advocate the idea of institutional differentiation (for a critical review see Hartmann, 2006; 
Münch, 2007). 
1.3.2 Impact of Excellence Initiative 
Several authors have written about the outcomes of the Excellence Initiative on different 
aspects of the German higher education system. Many have observed that the Excellence 
Initiative caused an “atmosphere of departure and readiness to reform” in the universities, in 
which a so-called “mobilization effect” took place (Neidhardt, 2010, p. 59; translated by 
author). This mobilization of self-regulation and organizational re-structuring processes 
within the institutions began already before the first funding phase of the Excellence Initiative 
had started, as the institutions needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
internal decision-making structures in order to be able to successfully compete in the initiative 
successfully. Universities felt pressure to set priorities, produce successful project proposals, 
administer processes effectively and to create structures that promote excellent research, 
which led many German universities to reshape their governance structures, internal 
organization and their recruitment processes (BBAW, 2010; Kehm, 2012). In general, the 
anticipation of receiving more resources and improved working conditions has caused all 
university members to invest large amounts of time and effort into the application process 
(BBAW, 2010). 
The internal mobilization processes also included the increasing professionalization of 
university leadership and administration (Neidhardt, 2010). At the same time the university 
leaderships have been strengthened. While this happened de facto in most universities, it did 
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not necessarily change de jure as well (BBAW, 2010). It is expected that the Excellence 
Initiative will lead to a great increase in strategic management (Berthold, 2011). In 
accordance with those changes a similar development took place in human resource policies 
of universities. The traditionally reactive structural planning started developing towards a 
more proactive quality oriented personnel concept with a stronger influence of the university 
leadership (Schreiterer, 2010). However, in some cases the establishment of strong research 
clusters and graduate schools led to a rather unintended effect. As those new organizational 
actors are likely to follow their own agenda, they were acting against the intended integration 
of the university into one organizational actor, thereby rather decreasing the institution’s 
strategic capabilities (BBAW, 2010). In general, it is expected that conflicts will arise in 
universities that have received funding for excellence clusters and graduate schools and 
therefore had to redistribute their internal budget, which means that some departments gained 
resources at the expense of others. The effects of this are expected to be noticeable at the 
latest when the Excellence Initiative funding will end and henceforth the newly established 
structures need to be financed by the university itself. However, in universities that received 
additional funding through the Institutional Strategy, the effects have remained within 
reasonable limits so far. This can be explained by the fact that most Institutional Strategies 
include internal funding mechanisms that are open to every department and thereby help to 
absorb potential imbalances between departments that might arise from dominant research 
clusters (Gaehtgens, 2010).  
Despite being heatedly debated in the beginning, the Excellence Initiative has by now been 
widely accepted, at least with regard to having achieved its goals more or less successfully 
(BBAW, 2010). One important factor of success of the Excellence Initiative was the right 
timing. For all universities who applied successfully with their Institutional Strategies, the 
additional money helped to advance some internal restructuring processes that had been 
taking place anyway. One example are the internal structural changes that were taking place 
due to  the generational change that was happening in many universities at the time of the 
Excellence Initiative (Schreiterer, 2010). Another factor that supported the success was the 
fact that the whole reform process was steered by the German Research Council with only 
very limited influence by the government. This was perceived as very important, as it helped 
to increase the trust of all stakeholders into the reform process (Neidhardt, 2010). By basing 
the selection decisions on nothing but scientific merit, the German government delegated 
much control over the national knowledge production to the scientific community who 
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determined the selection criteria (Whitley, 2008). In general, the policy makers put large 
emphasis on institutional autonomy, which gives an indication of the underlying willingness 
of the government to grant a considerable amount of trust into the self-regulation capabilities 
of the institutions (BBAW, 2010). This was reflected in the unusually open thematic and 
formal specifications of the application process. In particular the explicit statement by the 
German Research Council which encouraged “unconventional ideas” in the application was 
welcomed by the universities and is believed to have led to a unusual degree of intrinsic 
motivation among the applicants (Neidhardt, 2010). Within the universities this seemed to 
have had positive effects on the communication culture. While academics stated that suddenly 
university leadership started to be more open to unconventional projects, the leaderships 
stressed that the different departments began to be more cooperative with regard to structural 
changes (Simon, Schulz, & Sondermann, 2010). 
One interesting observation is that the success in the Excellence Initiative is largely dependent 
on the experiences the universities already had with strategic profiling. In cases in which 
universities had already proven their strategic capabilities in the context of performance-based 
budget allocation systems or when being confronted with budget cuts, success in the 
application process was much more likely (BBAW, 2010). Due to the differences between the 
Länder the universities started from different vantage points. It is argued that the room to 
maneuver and the ability to create a successful Institutional Strategy is very dependent on the 
basic funding that is promised by the respective Länder government. Moreover, it seems to be 
the case that the more the governmental steering of a Land is based on mutual trust, 
deregulation and accountability, the larger the chances of success were  (Gaehtgens, 2010). 
This makes the Excellence Initiative also a competition between the federal governments 
which is reflected in various spin-off funding programs in the different Länder that were 
either supposed to support the regional universities in the application process or were meant 
to provide funding for projects and Institutional Strategies that had failed very closely 
(Gaehtgens, 2010). This “the winner takes it all” principle of the competitive Excellence 
Initiative is seen as problematic by some observers. It is believed to lead to an academic two-
class society in which the winners use the rest of the country as a “shopping mall” in which 
they “buy” the best researchers from other universities which didn’t succeed in the 
competition (Fach, 2008). 
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1.3.3 Excellence Initiative and institutional 
boundaries 
Another reason why the case of the Excellence Initiative can be expected to give an 
interesting insight into the organizational change dynamics caused by the promotion of 
strategic profiling is the German higher education system in itself which entails certain 
characteristics that make strategic positioning rather difficult.  
As mentioned above, the German higher education system has followed the egalitarian 
tradition of Humboldt (Hazelkorn, 2009; Strohschneider, 2009), which means that until 
recently there has been only moderate vertical and horizontal diversity, as the idea of vertical 
differentiation was a politically controversial concept for a long time (Ash, 2010; Kehm, 
2012). This is reflected in the German law, which provides a guarantee of equal access to 
higher education for German citizens (Meyer, 2010) and institutions of one type have always 
been considered to have more or less the same level of quality (Kehm, 2012). Especially the 
idea of universities as organizational actors is rather foreign to the traditional German model, 
as there has hardly been any room and legitimacy for the organization as an independent 
decision-making actor in the traditional system based on strong state authority and academic 
oligarchy (Krücken & Meier, 2006).  
Even though the Excellence Initiative was met with much resistance at first, it has had a 
surprisingly large effect. This may be explained by the generally difficult funding situation of 
the German higher education system, which makes any form of additional funding all the 
more attractive (Neidhardt, 2010). Retrospectively, budget cuts in the past have been 
identified as the government’s most important form of leverage. A surprisingly large change 
process was initiated using only small incentive in absolute numbers. The total funding of the 
Excellence Initiative over its total funding period from 2006-2017 did amount to as little as 
4.3 billion Euro, which is a rather small sum compared to the overall higher education budget 
in Germany. Currently, Germany invests about 1,3 % of its GDP in tertiary education, which 
in 2013 amounted to around 23.5 billion Euro. (HRK, 2014a). About 14.4 billion Euro were 
spent on research and development (BMBF, 2014a). Even though the total amount of the 
Excellence Initiative compared to the total budget spent on research and development is not 
particularly large, financial benefits for the successful institutions were significant. As the 
money from the Excellence Initiative has been distributed on a highly competitive basis to 
only a small number of universities, single institutions received a considerable sum, especially 
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compared to the rather limited regular funding provided by the Länder governments. This is 
especially true for financially constrained Länder in the Eastern parts of Germany, such as 
Berlin. 
As one of the Excellence Initiative’s aims is to make the German higher education sector 
more competitive internationally, it also implies the creation of more favorable conditions for 
attracting young talents and highly reputed researchers to German universities and to facilitate 
change in the personnel structures and regulations within the higher education institutions 
(BBAW, 2010). However, strict salary regulations of German civil servants and highly 
regulated budget management within the institutions further limits the room to maneuver of 
German universities (BBAW, 2010), making it more difficult to meet those demands and to 
develop a long-term strategic profile (Gaehtgens, 2010). As emphasized by  Meyer (2010), it 
is important to keep in mind that German universities are highly regulated public institutions. 
He points out that the Excellence Initiative was designed without taking into consideration all 
relevant regulatory obstacles. Many sceptics are concerned that this might result in the 
emergence of „parallel structures“ and internal fragmentation within the institutions 
(Gaehtgens, 2010; Schreiterer, 2010). Which actual changes the Excellence Initiative will lead 
to can therefore be expected to depend on institutional forces, such as the already existing 
internal structures, institutionally defined expectations, ideas and practices within the German 
universities  (Fumasoli et al., 2012). 
To summarize, the characteristics of the German Excellence Initiative and its context make 
this case a valuable empirical setting for this study. For one, it is a policy instrument which is 
explicitly aiming at the increase of strategic behavior in German higher education institutions. 
Second, it takes place in a higher education system which is under pressure to change while 
being strongly regulated at the same time. On top of that, even though there has been a lot of 
empirical research on the impact of the Excellence Initiative in a variety of areas, there has 
not yet been a study focusing on the changes in strategic behavior at German universities. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the above considerations, this thesis attempts to investigate strategic behavior of 
higher education institutions and the ways in which it is changing. To narrow down the vast 
field of organizational change and the possible factors that can influence it, the focus of 
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interest will lay on the question how strategic behavior of universities is influenced by policy 
instruments such as the German Excellence Initiative. The changes will be examined in 
various areas of the university related to strategic behavior, such as changes in governance, 
human resource policies and research profiling (Fumasoli, 2011). 
 The following questions will be addressed: 
(1) Which organizational changes took place within the university after the introduction of 
the Excellence Initiative? 
a. Which changes took place in the university’s internal governance after the 
introduction of the Excellence Initiative? 
b. Which changes took place with respect to the university’s human resource 
policies after the introduction of the Excellence Initiative? 
c. Which changes took place with respect to the university’s research profile after 
the introduction of the Excellence Initiative? 
(2) What role does the institutional leadership play in triggering these changes? 
(3) To what extent are these changes influenced by institutional forces?  
The first question aims at examining the actual changes that have been taking place within the 
organization, following the introduction of the Excellence Initiative. The second question 
takes the inquiry one step further by examining how the observed organizational changes 
might have been triggered by strategic choice of the institutional leadership. Finally, the third 
question asks to what extent those organizational changes are conforming to pressures in the 
institutional environment. Examples for institutional forces are already existing internal 
structures, professional identities, institutional identity, institutional norms, institutional 
traditions and regulations. 
1.5 Thesis outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: first, an analytical framework will be outlined 
based on the integration of resource dependency theory and institutional theory. An argument 
of how to investigate the research questions will be constructed, mainly drawing on the ideas 
developed by  Oliver (1991) and Fumasoli (2011) of how to conceptualize and analyze 
organizational strategies. In the third chapter the methodological approach will be explained 
in detail, followed by an overview of the empirical setting of this study in chapter four. Next, 
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in chapter five the findings of the analysis will be presented and based on those outcomes a 
possible approach to answering the research questions will be outlined. In the sixth and final 
chapter it will be discussed how the findings contribute to the research on strategic behavior 
in universities and how it can be influenced by policy instruments. 
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2 Analytical Framework 
2.1 Institutional Theory and Resource 
Dependency Theory 
This thesis builds upon a combination of two prominent perspectives on organizational 
behavior: resource dependency theory  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Resource dependency theory focuses on the adaptive 
capabilities of organizations which are assumed to adjust their behavior according to the 
observed changes in their environment. By contrast, institutional theory stresses the taken-for-
grantedness of organizational action and the importance of cultural elements in the 
organizational process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, the two perspectives converge 
in a number of points. First and foremost they share the basic assumptions that organizational 
behavior is constrained by various external pressures, and that organizations can only survive 
when they are responsive to those external demands and expectations (Maassen & Gornitzka, 
1999). In addition, both assume that a) organizational environments are collective and 
interconnected; b) organizations seek stability, predictability, legitimacy; and that c) 
organizations are interest driven (see also Oliver, 1991). By combining the two perspectives, 
this framework follows the attempts of various authors (e.g. Gornitzka, 1999; Huisman & 
Meek, 1999; Oliver, 1991) who argue that the best account of organizational behavior 
integrates both perspectives. Examples of integrated approaches for investigating 
organizational change in higher education empirically include Huisman and Meek (1999) and 
Reale and Seeber (2011). These authors use the analytical framework developed by Oliver 
(1991), which combines the two perspectives in order to investigate organizational behavior. 
Oliver’s framework rests on the assumption that, while organizations are affected by their 
institutional structure, they are also able to make strategic choices by manipulating their 
environment (Oliver, 1991). Oliver argues that „given resource dependency theory’s focus on 
the methods and benefits of noncompliance in response to external demands, this theory 
provides a particularly appropriate basis of comparison for revealing institutional theory’s 
delimiting assumptions and for identifying the full repertoire of alternative strategies available 
to organizations“ (Oliver, 1991, p. 173). 
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Huisman and Meek (1999) investigated curricular innovations in two Dutch universities by 
applying Oliver’s suggested typology of strategic responses. They show that both institutional 
and task environments of universities are created to a considerable extent by the government. 
These environments in turn seem to determine to a certain degree the types of strategies 
chosen by the universities. Reale and Seeber (2011) developed a new model based on Oliver’s 
framework after difficulties applying it to highly heterogeneous institutions and to cases of 
less clearly defined environmental pressures such as budget cuts. Nonetheless, their findings 
show the integrated theoretical approach to be well suited for explaining organizational 
changes within higher education institutions.  
This thesis will examine in how far organizational changes within a German university can be 
interpreted as strategic responses to external pressures in form of the policy instrument 
Excellence Initiative. To this end I will use Oliver’s typology of organizational responses to 
investigate whether the changes within the university have been triggered by strategic choice 
or whether they have emerged from within the institution. In terms of analyzing an 
organizational change process, one can think of the policy instrument as the independent 
variable influencing the dependent variable, i.e. strategic behavior within the organization. In 
order to ensure sound construct validity, those variables need to be operationalized carefully. 
First, I will give an overview of how the Excellence Initiative will be characterized as 
proposed by Oliver (1991). This will serve as the framework for analyzing the university’s 
responses to the policy instrument. Second, using Oliver’s framework I will outline the 
dimensions along which strategic behavior will be characterized. On this basis it will be 
analyzed which of the observed organizational changes can be interpreted as strategic 
behavior. Third, I will describe the indicators that will be used to identify organizational 
change within Berlin Humboldt University, thereby highlighting the areas that are most likely 
to provide insight into strategic behavior.  
2.2 Characterizing policy instruments 
To begin with, it is important to delineate which definition of policy is used for this 
characterization. As proposed by Maassen and Gornitzka (1999, p. 14) policy is defined as 
follows:  
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„A policy is a public statement of an objective and the kind of instruments that will be 
used to achieve it.“ 
A public statement is considered to be based on a decision in an elected assembly at the 
national level and to have the approval of the parliament. Consequently, the Excellence 
Initiative can be defined as a policy instrument that is used to achieve an overall policy 
objective of increasing competitiveness and differentiation within the German higher 
education sector. Policy instruments are likely to give input into organizational change 
processes at the institutional level (Maassen & Gornitzka, 1999). The Excellence Initiative 
can be seen as an environmental pressure to which German universities respond. According to 
Oliver (1991) an organizational response depends on the following five characteristics of the 
environmental pressure: 
 Why is the organization being pressured to conform to institutional rules or 
expectations? (CAUSE) 
 Who is exerting institutional pressure on the organization? (CONSTITUENTS) 
 To what norms or requirements is the organization being pressured to conform? 
(CONTENT) 
 How or by what means are the pressures being exerted? (CONTROL) 
 What is the environmental context within which institutional pressures are being 
exerted? (CONTEXT) 
For an analysis of the Excellence Initiative and of its influence on strategic behavior within 
universities, it will be helpful to characterize it using this model. Doing so will give us a basis 
for explaining the organizational changes that took place within Berlin Humboldt University. 
In what follows the five dimensions are further elaborated: 
Cause 
The cause of institutional pressures refers to the rationale, set of expectations, or intended 
objectives that underlie external pressures for conformity. Those reasons fall into two 
categories: social and economic fitness. While some pressures are created to make 
organizations more socially fit or acceptable, other pressures have objectives of economic 
accountability and rationalization. Strategic behavior will depend on the degree to which an 
organization agrees with the objectives of the external pressures. In terms of this case study, it 
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is interesting to see if the Excellence Initiative aims at increasing the economic performance 
of universities or if it aims at enhancing their legitimacy, for example by increasing their 
social relevance. The cause behind the Excellence Initiative will be identified by examining 
its formulated objectives, in particular with respect to the social and/or economic fitness of 
higher education institutions. 
Constituents 
Institutional constituents include the state, professions, interest groups and the general public. 
They impose a variety of laws, regulations and expectations on the organization. In general, 
organizations face different and often conflicting demands from multiple constituents. This 
often makes unilateral conformity to the environment difficult, as the satisfaction of one 
constituent often requires ignoring or defying the demands of another. This dimension will be 
examined by identifying who the constituents of the Excellence Initiative are and to what 
degree their demands diverge. Those constituents could be the Federal Government, the 
Länder Governments, as well as several other stakeholders interested in changing higher 
education institutions to their benefit. Those stakeholders include the academics themselves, 
industry representatives and students. 
Content 
Two elements of the content of the environmental pressure itself are especially important for 
predicting strategic behavior. We need to examine whether the content is consistent with the 
goals of the organization. Another impacting factor is whether the environmental pressure 
causes a loss of decision-making discretion, i.e. autonomy. This dimension will therefore be 
exmined by identifying the extent to what the demands of the Excellence Initiative are 
consistent with the goals of the university and whether organizational autonomy is being 
impacted by the changes.  
Control 
Institutional control describes the means by which the environmental pressure is imposed on 
the organization. This happens through two main processes: implementation by means of 
authority and legal coercion, and implementation by pressuring for voluntary compliance. 
This dimension will be examined by identifying whether the implementation of the 
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Excellence Initiative is controlled more through voluntary diffusion or through legal coercion. 
Legal coercion implies a variety of regulations and laws that are used to ensure the 
participation of the universities in the Excellence Initiative. Control by voluntary diffusion 
occurs when participation and compliance are increased by giving incentives and using name 
and shame. 
Context 
The environmental context is important for predicting the organizational response to a given 
pressure. The most important element of the context is the degree of environmental 
uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty occurs when future conditions of the environment can 
be anticipated or accurately predicted. This dimension will therefore be examined by 
identifying the level of uncertainty of the institutional environment of the university. Of 
particular interest are the uncertainties arising from fast-changing developments in the so-
called knowledge society, as well as the changing paradigms in the European higher 
education sector, which may have significant impact on the perceived ability of the university 
to predict the future conditions of its environment. 
2.3 Characterizing strategic behavior  
Oliver (1991) provides a detailed framework of behavior an organization may enact in 
response to environmental pressures, for example to the Excellence Initiative in this case. She 
proposes five types of responses, which vary in the supposed degree of agency on the part of 
the organization from passivity to increasing active resistance. The aim is to investigate 
whether and how the organizational changes that took place after the Excellence Initiative can 
be typified in terms of the responses proposed by Oliver (1991). This will help answering the 
following two questions:  
(1) What role does the institutional leadership play in triggering these changes? 
(2) To what extent are these changes influenced by institutional forces?  
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Table 1: Typology of organizational responses, adapted from Oliver (1991) 
Response Definition Examples in University 
Acquiesce 
Following invisible, taken-
for-granted norms and 
traditions, and obeying 
rules 
Universities reproduce widely institutionalized 
roles such as professors, students, 
administrators and leadership positions based 
on conventional definitions of these activities 
without questioning them 
Universities consciously change their research 
profile in order to comply with the societal 
demands 
Compromise 
Balancing expectations of 
multiple constituents by 
negotiation and placating 
their needs to the extent 
that institutional norms are 
not jeopardized 
 
Universities conform to clearly stated 
objectives of a policy instrument, but will not 
change anything beyond the necessary 
Universities bargain with government about 
how many graduates they are expected to 
produce 
Avoid 
Avoiding the need to 
conform to environment, 
while disguising 
nonconformity 
 
Universities engage in “window dressing” and 
develop a strategy document but show no effort 
to actually implement it 
Universities attempt to be vague about their 
research profile in order to be buffered from 
scrutiny of the details of this activity 
Universities escape need to successfully 
compete in prestigious funding schemes by 
changing its objectives and mission to a more 
practical orientation 
Defy 
Defying explicit norms 
and values and contesting 
or ignoring rules and 
requirements 
Universities ignore demand to reorganize their 
internal structures if that diverges dramatically 
from their institutional values and traditions 
Universities challenge rationale behind a policy 
instrument by calling it “not rational” and use 
this as an explanation not to take part 
Universities openly attack media coverage of 
the positive public opinion toward a policy 
instrument 
Manipulate 
Manipulating environment 
and shaping values and  
norms  
 
Universities attempt to persuade students to 
take part in their decision-making bodies in 
order to neutralize their opposition 
Universities attempt to influence the 
performance criteria by which they are 
evaluated 
Universities attempt to alter the way in which 
their achievements are announced to the public 
by developing their own rankings 
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2.4 Indicators of strategic responses in higher 
education institutions 
In order to analyze organizational responses according to the typology provided by Oliver 
(1991), it is necessary to identify indicators that help to observe strategic behavior within 
higher education institutions. By adapting the analytical framework used by Fumasoli (2011), 
strategic behavior will be observed by identifying patterns of organizational decisions and 
actions. The analysis will be carried out on the institutional level, as the notion of strategy is 
much more relevant at the overall university level. As outlined by Bonaccorsi and Daraio 
(2007), the reasons for this are manifold. First, in most universities strategic decisions are 
made at the institutional level and not at lower levels. Second, strategic decisions concerning 
the profile of activities usually require formal authorization at the institutional level. Third, 
resources for new staff and buildings are typically being reallocated following centralized 
decision processes. And last, institutional rules of recruitment processes are mainly 
established at the institutional level. The analysis at the institutional level will also help 
shedding light on the extent to which the university can be understood as an integrated 
strategic actor. 
The probability of observing strategic behavior in response to environmental pressures is high 
in the following sectors: a) internal governance, b) research and c) human resource policy. For 
this reason we will examine those sectors in detail. The first research question (1) Which 
organizational changes took place after the introduction of the Excellence Initiative? will be 
addressed by empirically examining which changes took place in those three sectors. As 
organizational change in itself is a phenomenon that is difficult to observe, it is important to 
provide a clear operationalization by identifying observable indicators that suggest 
organizational change. 
In the sector of internal governance, indicators of strategic behavior will be organizational 
structures, strategic planning and internal actors, all of which are likely to change in response 
to environmental pressures. This can be observed through organizational charts, strategy 
documents and by interviewing internal actors. In the sector of research, strategic behavior 
will be observed through the indicators of research collaborations, number of doctoral 
students and acquisition of external funds. Those indicators help to identify possible changes 
in research activity and profile that might take place as a strategic response. They can be 
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observed through documents informing about research profile, performance reports and by 
interviewing internal actors involved in research. In the sector of human resource policy, the 
indicators for strategic behavior will be the evolution of staff, as well as the way in which 
personnel planning is carried out, for example through the introduction of tenure track or 
through new recruitment procedures and criteria. We assume that those indicators will help 
discover changes that can be interpreted as strategic responses to environmental pressures. 
They can be observed through regulative documents for human resource procedures, 
performance reports and by interviewing internal actors involved in human resource 
decisions.  
If it is possible to examine changes in any of these indicators, one can infer that 
organizational change is taking place. Furthermore, by inspecting the patterns these changes 
show over time, one can then identify those changes as organizational strategies, which may 
have been initiated deliberately or may have emerged over the years (Mintzberg, 2007). As 
this thesis will analyze the patterns of change that have taken place since the Excellence 
Initiative has been introduced, it can be assumed that those patterns might have emerged in 
relation to this policy instrument. By matching the observed organizational behavior with 
Oliver’s suggested typology, it will thereby be possible to address the question whether the 
observed behavior patterns are triggered by strategic choice or by institutional forces, thereby 
addressing research questions (2) What role does the institutional leadership play in 
triggering these changes? and (3) To what extent are these changes triggered by institutional 
forces?. This will in turn contribute to the more general question whether universities can be 
perceived as proactive strategic actors or if their behavior should be rather understood as a 
reaction to external pressures. As organizational strategies are defined as “patterns of 
decisions and actions […] recognized and shared by organizational members as a collective 
pursuit of organizational goals” (Fumasoli & Lepori, 2011, p. 3), it is essential to conduct 
interviews with university members in order to be able to judge whether an observed 
organizational change can be interpreted as a strategic response. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
This work uses the research design of an embedded case study. As defined by Yin (2014, p. 
16) a case study is understood as an empirical inquiry that: 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context, 
especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. 
This case study of Berlin Humboldt University is considered to be embedded because even 
though only a single case is used, it involves units of analysis at more than one level and 
because attention is given to subunits as well as the overall unit. As the rationale behind the 
choice of Humboldt University is based on the research question, this case can be considered 
to be of a critical nature (Yin, 2014). This means it was chosen because it has all the critical 
characteristics (successful participation in the Excellence Initiative, highly institutionalized 
environment) required to provide satisfying answers to the research questions. Moreover, 
because Humboldt University received funding for its Institutional Strategy through the 
Excellence Initiative only in 2012 after having failed in the former rounds in 2006 and 2007, 
it is assumable that organizational changes have taken place to the Excellence Initiative in 
between 2006 and 2012. In order for the case to provide critical empirical evidence, the theory 
under scrutiny must provide a clear set of circumstances in which its propositions are believed 
to be true, which the case selection should then be based on (Yin, 2014). This clear set of 
circumstances is provided by Oliver’s framework. The following section gives a more 
detailed overview of the selection procedure of the case. 
3.1.1 Previous approach 
It is important to mention that an earlier approach of this thesis had a slightly different focus 
than the current version. This should be kept in mind in order to understand the development 
of research design and the selection of cases for the current thesis. 
As pointed out by Yin (2014), it is often necessary to adapt the research design during the 
data collection. A previous approach aligned with the rationale of the FLAGSHIP project 
currently being conducted at ARENA Research Centre for European studies of the University 
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of Oslo. This project, which investigates empirically how European flagship universities are 
interpreting and translating their institutional autonomy into practice, includes several case 
studies of a number of flagship universities in continental European countries (Fumasoli et al., 
2012). The original idea of this thesis was to investigate the changes in academic recruitment 
at departmental level due to the effects of the German Excellence Initiative. The research 
design relied on an embedded case study of both an Excellence Cluster and a regular 
department of the same disciplinary field within a German university. The first analysis of the 
internal organization of the two structures was based on the accessible information online and 
led to the assumption that the chosen Excellence Cluster had emerged from a regular 
department of the university and that several academics had affiliations with both structures, 
whereas some other academics were affiliated to only one of the two.  
This seemed to make the two cases interesting subjects for a comparison of the effects of the 
Excellence Initiative on the recruitment procedures on the departmental level, as they share 
most characteristics while differing in exactly one variable - being awarded ‘excellence’ 
status - which was central to the research question. However, the first interviews revealed that 
the strict recruitment regulations within the university and the Land it was located in made it 
more or less impossible for the Excellence Initiative to create any kind of observable 
difference between the new structure of the Excellence Cluster and the regular department. 
Moreover it became clear that the university had chosen not to grant any structural autonomy 
to its Excellence Cluster. As a result, the cluster remained an integrated part of a faculty and 
its recruitment procedures were dependent on the decisions made within the faculty just as it 
is the case with any other department. While this is an interesting finding in itself, it didn’t 
provide sufficient basis for an analysis. 
Nonetheless the interviews were rich in information on changes within German universities. 
In particular the topic of change in strategic behavior was a predominant theme in all of them. 
This led to the decision to shift the focus to the current topic of this thesis, which is now 
focused on the emergence of strategic behavior of the whole university rather than on the 
institutional autonomy at the departmental level.  
3.1.2 Definition and selection of cases 
An examination of organizational change due to the Excellence Initiative requires, as a case, a 
higher education institution in Germany that is participating in this competition. The case was 
29 
 
chosen based on a defined set of operational criteria whereby the possible candidates would 
be deemed qualified to serve as cases (Yin, 2014). In order to make sure that the case would 
most likely provide the empirical data needed to answer the questions, one important criterion 
was a high level of institutional autonomy. This criterion was operationalized as follows: 
• Comprehensive university in a major urban area with a scientific leading role at 
the national level (Flagship university) 
o Explanation: Flagship universities can be expected to be given more 
leeway than smaller and less research intensive universities, which is why 
they provide a good case for investigating autonomy within higher 
education (Fumasoli et al., 2012) 
As second criterion, the successful participation in the Excellence Initiative was 
operationalized as follows: 
• Institution received funding in the third funding line ’Institutional Strategies’ in 
one of the three rounds (2006, 2007 and 2012) 
Based on these criteria, Humboldt University (HU) in Berlin was identified as the most 
appropriate case, as it can be expected to have enough room to maneuver in order to develop 
strategic behavior. Moreover, HU successfully secured funding for its Institutional Strategy in 
the third round of the Excellence Initiative in 2012. The fact that HU’s Institutional Strategy 
application had been unsuccessful in previous rounds of the competition in 2006 and 2007 
adds another interesting aspect to the case. It can be expected that both failure and the process 
of reapplying may have a particularly strong impact on the institution’s strategic behavior. 
Finally, the first interviews revealed that HU has an unusual set of institutional characteristics 
in forms of strong traditions and norms that make it likely to exhibit institutional rigidities 
that interfere with organizational change processes. As a former poster child of the 
Humboldtian tradition, HU is therefore very protective of its norms and values. At the same 
time the university used to be in the former German Democratic Republic (DDR), a country 
with strong regulations and protective employment contracts which are still in use, in 
particular in the administration of the university. 
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The time frame used for the collection of data covers the years 2005 − 2014. As the first 
round of the Excellence Initiative was announced in the year 2005 (BAnz, 2005), it can be 
argued that changes in strategic behavior are observable starting with this first official 
announcement.  
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
3.2.1 Sources of evidence 
In order to be able to answer the research questions, several sources of evidence are being 
used. First and foremost an analysis of relevant documents related to the university and the 
Excellence Initiative such as strategy documents, regulations and meeting protocols is being 
conducted. Moreover, semi-structured interviews with different actors of the HU are being 
carried out.  
In total, the following sources are used: 
 Documents related to Excellence Initiative 
 Documents related to Humboldt University 
 Legal framework documents 
 Semi-structured interviews  
Documents 
The HU provides easy access to a wide variety of valuable documents, some of them lasting 
back as long as 20 years. Most documents were downloaded from official websites of the 
university and in many cases various versions were available which have been revised and 
updated over the last years. As most of them are official documents of public interest, the 
error and distortion rate can be considered to be low and both high authenticity and 
representativeness are given (Bryman, 2012). In particular the performance reports of the HU 
presidium and the common performance reports of all Berlin universities to the Berlin 
Government have been a valuable source, as they contained a detailed account of the changes 
that took place within the HU.  
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The following documents have been used:  
Table 2: Documents used for analysis 
Type of 
document 
Original title Translated title Publisher 
Strategy 
document 
Zukunftskonzept  der 
Humboldt Universität, 
2012 
Institutional Strategy 
of Humboldt 
University, 2012 
Humboldt 
University 
Human 
resource 
document 
Hochschulstrukturplan 
seit 2004 
Structural Plan of 
Humboldt University 
since 2004 
Humboldt 
University 
Human 
resource 
document 
Hochschulstrukturplan 
1998 - 2004 
Structural Plan of 
Humboldt University 
1998 - 2004 
Humboldt 
University 
Legal 
framework 
Fünf 
Hochschulverträge 
zwischen dem Land 
Berlin und der HU 
1998 – 2000 
2001 – 2002 
2003 – 2005 
2006 – 2009 
2010 – 2013 
2014 -  2017 
Five consecutive 
contracts between 
HU and Berlin 
Government 
1998 – 2000 
2001 – 2002 
2003 – 2005 
2006 – 2009 
2010 – 2013 
2014 - 2017 
Berlin 
Government 
Annual report Zehn jährliche 
Rechenschaftsberichte 
des HU Präsidiums 
2003 - 2012 
Ten annual 
performance reports 
of the HU presidium 
2003- 2012 
Humboldt 
University 
Annual report Acht jährliche 
Leistungsberichte der 
Berliner Hochschulen 
zum Berliner Senat 
2005-2012 
Eight annual 
performance reports 
of all Berlin 
universities to Berlin 
Government 
2005-2012 
Universities 
of Berlin 
Legal 
framework 
Berliner 
Hochschulgesetz 
(BerlHG) 
Berlin University 
Act 
Länder 
government 
Berlin 
Legal 
framework 
Verfassung der 
Humboldt-Universität 
zu Berlin, Letzte 
Version Oktober 2013 
Constitution of 
Humboldt 
University, latest 
version of October 
2013 
Academic 
Council of 
Humboldt 
University 
News articles Auswahl von 
Zeitungsartikeln des 
Berliner Tagesspiegels 
bzgl. HU, 2003-2013 
Selection of articles 
from Berlin 
Tagesspiegel related 
to HU, 2003-2013 
Tagesspiegel 
Berlin 
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Interviews 
The interviews are an essential part of this study, as they shed light on the patterns of 
decisions and actions which need to be “recognized and shared by organizational members as 
a collective pursuit of organizational goals” in order to be considered as strategic behavior 
(Fumasoli & Lepori, 2011, p. 3). By interviewing university members it is therefore possible 
to investigate whether an observed organizational change can be interpreted as a strategic 
response. By gathering as much information from the documents as possible it was possible to 
carry out the interviews with a focus on the parts that needed further clarification. This was 
also helpful for understanding the informal aspects of the strategic behavior identified in the 
documents.  
Ten semi-structured interviews have been conducted with a range of different respondents in 
addition to the document analysis. In order to get a comprehensive overview of the 
organizational changes taking place in the university, it was necessary to conduct interviews 
on all levels, i.e. on the institutional level, the faculty level and the department level. Six of 
the respondents held leadership positions, as those positions were expected to have more 
insight into decision-making processes and the rationales behind. To also get the perspective 
of other member groups, interviews were conducted with an academic employee (Mittelbau), 
an administrator and two regular professors. Before selection the respondents it has been 
made sure that they have had concrete contact with the development or implementation of the 
Excellence Initiative (e.g. by being members consultative bodies, being involved in Graduate 
Schools or Excellence Clusters). 
For reasons of anonymity, only information will be given on the position and disciplinary 
field of the respondent.  
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Table 3: Interview overview 
Position Level Disciplinary field Code 
Leading position Faculty Humanities HU01 
Leading position Institution Social Sciences HU02 
Leading position Department Social Sciences HU03 
Professor Department Humanities HU04 
Leading position Faculty Social Sciences HU05 
Leading position Faculty Natural Sciences HU06 
Leading position Institution Humanities HU07 
Academic employee (Mittelbau) Department Humanities HU08 
Professor Department Social Sciences HU09 
Administrator Institution N/A HU10 
 
In the first step potential interviewees were contacted by email explaining the rationale behind 
the research study with a request for an interview. As it turned out in the first round of 
interviews, the topics of academic recruitment and Excellence Initiative both seemed to be of 
a sensitive nature, as many approached candidates refused to participate in a study on those 
topics systematically and with strong determination. While most didn’t give specific reasons, 
one pointed out negative experiences in the past with regard to interviews aimed at the 
Excellence Initiative. This might be explained by the several big scale evaluations of the 
Excellence Initiative that have been conducted in the last years (e.g. Sondermann, 2008). 
Considering the relatively small pool of academics being involved with the Excellence 
Initiative, it might be possible that they are regularly approached with requests of interviews 
on this topic. The overall response rate was therefore quite low. Out of 12 contacted people 
only 4 agreed to participate. In the second round another 19 people were contacted, out of 
whom 6 more agreed to participate, thereby adding up to 10 interview partners. This makes a 
total response rate of one third. 
An interview guideline was used and notes were taken. All interviewees agreed on being 
recorded and the interviews lasted between 45 − 90 minutes.  All interviews were held in 
German and were completely anonymized according to the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services. They were entirely transcribed in German, which produced 175 pages of text for 
analysis. The quotes used in this thesis were translated by the author who is a German native 
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speaker. The interview guideline and the analysis of the transcripts followed the propositions 
outlined in the section 3.2.1. For an example see appendix 1. 
3.2.2 Criteria for interpretation of the findings 
This section addresses the quality criteria of the research design at hand indicating in which 
way the findings can be interpreted and generalized. The relevant criteria are construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.  
Construct validity 
It is very important to ensure that the phenomena or constructs studied in this thesis are not 
defined on the basis of a subjective impression only, but are based on theoretical propositions 
derived from the literature review. Without any prior specification of which operational 
elements constitute the phenomenon of organizational change, the reader cannot tell whether 
the changes that are claimed to be observed in this case study do in fact genuinely reflect the 
actual change happening in the higher education institutions or whether those claims are 
rather based on the researcher’s subjective impressions only (Yin, 2014). Therefore, this 
thesis uses a detailed characterization of strategic responses based on the framework 
developed by Oliver (1991). Moreover, a number of indicators for strategic behavior are 
identified according to Fumasoli’s (2011) approach to analyzing organizational strategies in 
higher education institutions. By giving this kind of detailed definition of the studied 
phenomena and by identifying operational variables it is attempted to increase the construct 
validity. 
Internal validity 
The concern over internal validity is related to the general question in how far it is possible to 
make inferences to unobservable events based on measurable operational events. In this thesis 
for example, one proposition is that the influence of the Excellence Initiative which in itself is 
an unobservable phenomenon can be inferred from the observation of different 
operationalized variables like for example governance structures which are written down in 
actual documents and might have changed in the time period the Excellence Initiative was 
implemented (Yin, 2014). The more detailed and comprehensive the theory-based 
propositions are, the more confidence can be taken in case the findings show the proposed 
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pattern of changes. In addition, a variety of data sources is used making it possible to 
triangulate the data and thereby enhance its validity. According to Yin (2014), data 
triangulation is one of the major strengths of case study research, as it allows to cross-check 
the retrieved information over a number of different sources. The more the evidence 
converges, the more confident can one be of the validity of the findings.  
External validity 
The criterion of external validity gives an indication to what extent the findings of the case 
study at hand are generalizable to a larger population. It is important to point out the 
difference between statistical generalization and analytic generalization. As pointed out by 
Yin (2014), case studies are not generalizable to populations in the sense that the case is a 
“sample” and it is possible to measure the statistical significance of the findings for the whole 
population. Instead, generalization should be considered to be of an analytic nature. By 
interpreting the outcomes in the context of the integrative approach of institutional theory and 
resource dependency theory, the findings could be considered as forming a kind of working 
hypothesis which then can either be applied to reinterpreting the results of existing studies or 
defining new research focusing on other concrete situations (Yin, 2014). The analytic 
generalization thereby aims at expanding and generalizing theories (Yin, 2014). 
Reliability 
Reliability is ensured by documenting all steps of the research study in detail in order to 
provide as much transparency as possible. If later another investigator followed the same 
procedures, he or she should arrive at the same finding again. The goal of reliability is 
moreover to minimize errors and biases in the study, which will be ensured by documenting 
the chains of thoughts that have led to certain decisions in the phase of the study design and 
data collection, and by staying in close consultation with the supervisors (Yin, 2014).  
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4 Empirical Setting 
In this chapter the empirical setting of this case study will be described in detail. This will 
help to understand the context which is important to interpret the findings correctly. First, an 
overview will be given of the German higher education system to understand the environment 
in which Berlin Humboldt University operates. In the following section, the focus will shift to 
the Excellence Initiative which is the policy instrument in question. Here an overview of its 
objectives and its application and selection procedures will be given. Moreover information 
on the actual funding decisions will be provided. The final section gives a detailed description 
of Berlin Humboldt University with information on its historical background, its 
organizational structure and governance, as well as some basic facts and figures. Most of the 
data is based on online resources provided by the university and the German Research 
Foundation (DFG). It is important to remind that this thesis claims no liability for the data, as 
the only purpose is to reveal an overall trend. 
4.1 Germany’s federal higher education system 
In order to understand the development of the Excellence Initiative, it is important to see it 
against the backdrop of the federal system in Germany and the consequences it has for 
governance and funding of higher education. Germany has a binary higher education system 
consisting of 110 universities (including technical universities) and 221 universities of applied 
sciences (Fachhochschulen). The whole system has a combined student population of about 
2.4 million (HRK, 2014b). In the following only the universities will be referred to because 
the competition of the Excellence Initiative was only open to universities.  
The original Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 set the legal 
foundation of today’s German education system. One of the core principles is the sovereignty 
of the sixteen Länder over the higher education institutions within their borders. The federal 
government is generally not allowed to influence the decisions within the (higher) education 
sector, which also means that it is not allowed to provide direct funding to the institutions. 
While federalism is in general seen as one of the main strengths of the German political 
system, it has also been exposed to criticism. In particular during the time of increasing 
student numbers in the 60s, the financial problems of the Länder became particularly obvious 
within the universities which were unable to accommodate the large amounts of students. 
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After dramatic student protests the strict separation of Federal Government and Länder was 
loosened up and an amendment to the Basic Law was made in 1969 that permitted the Federal 
Government to share responsibility with the Länder governments in educational matters. This 
meant that the Federal Government, which was financially much stronger than the Länder, 
was able to provide more financial support for the higher education sector. In return, the 
Federal Government was granted more rights of influencing the decision making process 
within the educational sector. This led to the creation of a nation-wide Framework Act for 
Higher Education in 1976 that regulated the functions of the university, the admission process 
and how the universities were to be organized in every Land. Even though each Land still had 
its own Higher Education Act, they were now obliged to adapt it in accordance with the 
nation-wide Framework Act (BMBF, 2014b). 
With regard to Humboldt University it is important to take into consideration that it is located 
in the Eastern part of Berlin and was therefore operating under the government of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) between 1949 and 1990. Even though the GDR originally had 
plans to put its universities under Länder control like the West had decided to do, it soon went 
the opposite way and tried to build a stronger higher education system by centralizing it 
through strict control mechanisms (Giles, 1978). However, with the reunification in 1990 the 
eastern and western part of Berlin were reunited and Humboldt University was from then on 
governed according to the Higher Education Act of the Land Berlin and the nation-wide 
Framework Act for Higher Education. The changes that took place in the Humboldt 
University after the reunification will be elaborated in a later section of this chapter. 
In the early 2000s, the discussion around federalism and the power balance between Federal 
Government and Länder started to heat up again and voices got louder that claimed the 
nation-wide Framework Act for Higher Education was restricting the Länder sovereignty to 
an extent that was considered unconstitutional. As a consequence, a general Federalism 
Reform was implemented in 2006 which intended to reorganize the relationship between the 
Federal Government and the Länder, not only in the educational sector but also in many other 
areas. Amongst others this reform reinforced the original idea that the Federal Government is 
not allowed to cooperate with the Länder in the higher education sector. This meant that the 
Länder received back their more or less unrestricted legislative power in educational matters 
but at the same time they were again to be solely responsible for providing the basic funding 
to their higher education institutions. However, there was one exception included in the 
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amendment of the Basic Law which stated that the Federal Government was still able to 
support the Länder in “cases of supraregional importance”. Examples of these cases are the 
promotion of facilities and projects of scientific research not affiliated with institutions of 
higher education, projects of science and research at institutions of higher education, and 
construction of research facilities at institutions of higher education, including large scientific 
installations within the framework of project (see Article 91 b Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law). 
The Excellence Initiative is considered to be one of those projects that are eligible for such a 
shared funding responsibility by the Federal Government and the Länder (BMBF, 2014b). 
The Federalism Reform of 2006 made the notoriously difficult financial situation of some 
Länder even more visible. Such was the case in Berlin, which helps explaining the different 
developments that took place within Berlin higher education politics in the years after 2006, 
during which several new funding instruments were developed within the Land Berlin. 
4.1.1 Important actors in German higher education 
There are three important actors that are playing a major role in German higher education 
governance and in particular in the Excellence Initiative. There is the Joint Science 
conference (Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz, GWK) which was established in the 
backdrop of the Federalism Reform in 2007, thereby replacing the former Commission of the 
Federal and Länder Governments for Educational Planning and Research Promotion (Bund-
Länder-Kommission, BLK). Just like the BLK the GWK is a permanent forum for the 
discussion of questions of education and research promotion which are of common interest to 
the Federal and States governments. However, due to the new limited cooperation between 
Federal Government and Länder, its main tasks are more limited than those of the former 
BLK. It is therefore first and foremost concerned with issues of supra-regional relevance, 
which includes the decision to provide money for Excellence Initiative (GWK, 2014).  
Another important actor in the German higher education sector is the Council of Science and 
Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) which constitutes an advisory body to both the Federal 
Government and the Länder and was founded in 1957. It comprises of scientists, 
representatives of the two tiers of government and of eminent public figures. By providing 
recommendations on the development of science, research and higher education, it is 
supposed to help to ensure that German science and humanities remain competitive at the 
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national, European and international level. The Council of Science and Humanities played a 
major role in designing and implementing the  Excellence Initiative (WR, 2014). 
Finally it is important to mention the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) which is the central self-governing funding organization for 
science and research in Germany since 1951. It is set up of members of German research 
universities, major research institutes, the Academies of Science and Humanities as well as a 
number of other scientific associations. Its main responsibility is to allocate funds to the 
German research institutions and it operates with an annual budget of around 2,4 billion Euro 
that is provided by the Federal government and the Länder. Its self-governance provides 
independence from the government and its funding allocation is strictly based on scientific 
merit. This predestined it to be the main responsible actor in the implementation of the 
Excellence Initiative (ERAWATCH, 2014). 
4.2 Excellence Initiative 
4.2.1 Objectives and scope 
The Excellence Initiative (BAnz, 2005) is intended to strengthen Germany as a location of 
excellent science and humanities, to enhance its international competitiveness, and to increase 
the visibility of top-level universities and research areas. The implementation of the 
Excellence Initiative can be considered one of Germany’s reactions to the European Lisbon 
Agenda 2000 which aimed at making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” (EU, 2000). 
The Excellence Initiative is conducted by the German Research Foundation and the German 
Council of Science and Humanities. It took place in three rounds (2006, 2007 and 2012) and 
consists of the following three funding lines: 
1. Institutional Strategies to strengthen the institution “university” and its research setting 
as a whole.  
2. Excellence Clusters to promote top-level research, 
3. Graduate Schools to promote young researchers,  
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The funding line "Institutional Strategies to promote top-level university research" is intended 
to strengthen universities as institutions to make them more competitive at an international 
top level. In order to be eligible for such funding universities need to develop a long-term 
Institutional Strategy for top-level research and the support of young researchers. This 
Institutional Strategy is supposed to address the current challenges and requirements of the 
university and to look at the institution as a whole. Moreover, it is supposed to expand the 
diversity of organization-models of top-level research and accelerate the functional 
differentiation of German universities. It strengthens the strategic skills and the autonomy of 
universities and strives for improving the performance of the research system as a whole 
(DFG, 2010c).  
The funding line ‘Excellence Clusters’ was designed to enable German universities to 
establish internationally visible and competitive research and training facilities. Moreover it is 
supposed to enhance scientific networking and cooperation among the participating 
institutions. Excellence Clusters should constitute an important part of a university's strategic 
planning, which in turn should help to raise its profile and reflect its long-term 
priorities.(DFG, 2010a). 
The funding line ‘Graduate Schools’ was designed in order to improve the training conditions 
of young researchers and to provide them with excellent research environments. Moreover, 
they are supposed to support shaping the university’s research and training profile (DFG, 
2010b). 
After three calls for proposals in 2006, 2007 and 2012, a total of € 4.6 bn of funding through 
all three funding lines were approved. This includes € 1.9 bn for the first and second rounds 
together (2006-2012) and € 2.7 bn for the third round (2012-2017). The Federal Government 
and the Länder shared the financial responsibility, with one quarter of the grant being 
provided by the Land where the successful university is located. The following benchmark 
figures were approved in the agreement between Federal and Länder Governments: 
Agreement on first and second program phase (BAnz, 2005): 
 Institutional Strategies: € 21 million per year for the respective university (including 
the excellence cluster and graduate school in that university) (in total ca. €210 m p.a.) 
 Excellence Clusters: € 6.5 million on average p.a. (in total ca. 30 clusters, i.e. € 195 m 
p.a.) 
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 Graduate schools: € 1 million on average p.a. (in total ca. 40 schools, i.e. € 40 m p.a.) 
Agreement on third program phase (BAnz, 2009): 
 Institutional Strategies: in total € 142 million p.a.  
 Excellence Clusters: € 3-8 million p.a. (in total ca. € 292 million p.a.) 
 Graduate schools: € 1 – 2.5 million p.a. (in total ca. € 60 million p.a.) 
All projects that were not able to renew their funding in the third phase, receive a degressive 
completion funding of two years. For this the Federal and Länder Governments provided € 
91,2 million that were gradually granted. In the first year after the end of the funding period 
they received up to 70% of the amount granted in the last year of funding and in the second 
year they received up to 40% of the amount. 
4.2.2 Application and selection procedure 
After lengthy negotiations between the Federal Government and the Länder, it was decided to 
have two rounds of selection, one in 2006 and the second in 2007. A third and final round 
took place in 2012 after the initial idea of repeating the competition every five years was 
abolished (Kehm, 2012).  
The German Research Foundation (DFG) is in overall responsible for the application 
procedure of the Excellence Initiative. Together with the German Council of Science and 
Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) the DFG has therefore set up a Joint Commission. This Joint 
Commission is responsible for specifying the terms of funding for the whole Excellence 
Initiative and for issuing funding recommendations for all three lines of funding.  
The commission consists of two parts: an Expert Commission which is composed of 14 
scientists and researchers appointed by the DFG Senate, and a Strategic Commission which 
consists of 6 members from the Scientific Commission of the German Council for Science 
and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) and 6 members from outside the Council. While the 
Expert Commission is responsible for preparing the decisions regarding Graduate Schools and 
Excellence Clusters, the Strategy Commission is responsible for selecting proposals within the 
funding line of Institutional Strategies.  
The final funding decisions are made by a Grants Committee consisting of the members of the 
Joint Commission plus the ministers responsible for research and science in the Federal and 
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Länder Governments. The members of the Joint Commission, have a 39 to 32 majority in the 
Grants Committee against the government representatives, thereby ensuring that the majority 
lays with the scientific community (BMBF, 2014b). 
All three calls were open to all German universities. The initial proposals were submitted 
following a two-stage-procedure: First, all German universities were invited to submit draft 
proposals. At the second stage, the Joint Commission selected a number of draft proposal 
based on the results of international review panels and those selected universities were asked 
to submit full proposals. Universities that had been funded during the first program phase 
were allowed to submit full follow-up proposals directly to the second program phase without 
having to submit a new draft proposal (DFG, 2010c). The selected universities had then about 
3 months to deliver a full proposal, which was reviewed by an international review panel, 
including on-site visits. Their evaluations were then brought forward to the Joint Commission. 
After having been discussed in the Joint Commission, recommendations were given to the 
Grants Committee which then made final decisions in all three funding lines. For a graphical 
overview of the application and selection procedure, please see appendix 2. 
It is interesting that the whole application procedure is strictly following principles based on 
scientific merit and the political actors are either not present at all (such as in the Expert 
Commission consisting only of scientific representatives from the DFG) or they are in a clear 
minority (such as in the Strategy Commission and the Grants Commission). In the media it 
has been pointed out several times that this little influence by the government was considered 
a great strength of the Excellence Initiative (Marquardt, 2011).  
4.2.3 Assessment criteria for Institutional Strategy 
In order to get funding for an Institutional Strategy the university is required to have been 
awarded funding for at least one Graduate School and one Excellence Cluster each (BAnz, 
2005). If this requirement was met, the university was supposed to develop a draft of an 
Institutional Strategy, which had to follow a guideline of criteria provided by DFG (see 
appendix 3). The DFG’s assessment criteria for Institutional Strategies considered amongst 
others the current research strengths of the university in different significant scientific and 
academic fields, its structural conditions for top-level research, and the universities’ ability to 
demonstrate an increase in quality or consistently high quality. In addition it was evaluated if 
the submitted proposal takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of the university and 
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was able to justify the expected increase in the university´s international competitiveness in 
the future (DFG & WR, 2010). A template of the Institutional Strategy was provided and the 
universities were asked to follow it as closely as possible. This also included a SWOT 
analysis and a detailed budget plan. As mentioned by several respondents, the requirements 
were perceived as rather open and the DFG encouraged the universities to develop 
unconventional ideas (HU06; HU07). However, as the assessment of the Institutional 
Strategies was based on the areas that were suggested to be covered in the template, it is very 
likely that the university de facto felt compelled to follow these suggestions, thereby being 
limited in their room to develop unconventional ideas (HU08). 
4.2.4 Funding decisions of Excellence Initiative 
In the first round in 2006, out of the ten universities short-listed in the third funding line, the 
majority of the institutions was located in the southern Länder of Germany and not even one 
university from the Eastern German Länder was selected. Despite the original target to award 
5 universities with funding in the third line, only three managed to fulfill the demanding 
requirements. Even though the Humboldt University had applied to the third funding line, its 
proposal was rejected in the first round (Kehm, 2012). However, it was awarded funding for 
two Graduate Schools (Mathematics; Psychology/Philosophy). 
In the second round in 2007, 6 universities were added to the 3 winners of the first round. The 
distribution was still skewed and most institutions were located in the south of Germany. Four 
of the six winning universities had been rejected in the former round but were now successful 
in the second round. While the other university in Berlin (Free University) succeeded in the 
second round, the Humboldt University was one of the three universities that was rejected a 
second time. However, it was awarded funding for two additional Graduate Schools 
(Medicine; Social Sciences) and its first two Excellence Clusters (Medicine; Humanities). 
In the third round in 2012 the geographical distribution of the short-listed institutions was 
more balanced and there were also more Eastern German universities amongst the winners.  
Berlin Humboldt University succeeded in the third round with its Institutional Strategy 
“Educating Inquiring Minds”. In addition it was awarded funding for two new Graduate 
Schools (Natural Sciences; Medicine) and three of the former Graduate Schools 
(Psychology/Philosophy; Medicine; Mathematics)  were successful in re-applying for 
funding, while one formerly funded Graduate School  (Social Sciences) did not succeed in the 
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re-application. The two formerly funded Excellence Clusters (Medicine; Humanities) also 
succeeded in re-applying and in addition another Excellence Cluster was added (Cultural 
Studies/Design). 
For a more detailed overview of the successes of Berlin Humboldt University in the different 
funding lines in the three application rounds, see appendix 4. 
Table 4: Funding decisions of Excellence Initiative 
 Institutional 
Strategies 
Graduate 
Schools 
Excellence 
Clusters 
Outcomes of first round (funding from 2006-2011) 
Number to be selected About 5  
(out of 10) 
About 20  
(out of 40) 
About 15  
(out of 30) 
Initial proposals received 27 135 157 
Selected for short-list (full 
proposal) 
10 39 39 
Winners 3 18 17 
Outcomes of second round (funding from 2007-2012) 
Number to be selected About 7 About 22 About 12 
Initial proposals received 20 118 123 
Unsuccessful round 1 proposals 
carried forward 
7 21 22 
Selected for short-list (full 
proposal) 
8 44 40 
Winners 6 21 20 
Total number after rounds 1 & 2 9 39 37 
Outcomes of third round in 2012 (funding from 2012-2017) 
Number to be selected 12 24-60 37-97 
Initial proposals received 22 98 107 
Proposals of winners of round 1 & 
2 automatically carried forward 
6 39 37 
Selected for short-list (full 
proposal) 
7 25 27 
Winners 
11  
(out of which 
5 new) 
45 
(out of which 12 
new) 
43 
(out of which 12 
new) 
Source: Kehm (2012) 
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Table 5: Winning Institutional Strategies 
Winning Institutional Strategies First round 
2006-2011 
Second round 
2007-2012 
Third round  
2012-2017 
LMU Munich X X  X 
Technical University of Munich X X  X 
University of Karlsruhe (KIT) X X  Not continued 
RWTH Aachen  X X 
Free University Berlin  X X 
University of Heidelberg  X X 
University of Konstanz  X X 
University of Freiburg  X Not continued 
University of Göttingen  X Not continued 
Humboldt University Berlin   X 
University of Bremen   X 
Technical University of Dresden   X 
University of Tübingen   X 
University of Cologne   X 
 
4.3 Berlin Humboldt University 
4.3.1 History 
Berlin Humboldt University was established in 1810 based on a foundation concept 
developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt. In the rise of the German Empire after 1871 the 
university which was formerly called Friedrich-Wilhelms University was considered to be the 
largest and one of the most important universities in the Empire. In general, in the time before 
World War I German universities were renowned to be the worldwide leading institutions in 
the science community  (Ben-David, 1984). This was partly due to the success of Humboldt’s 
concept which aimed at a "Universitas litterarum" which included a unity of teaching and 
research and an all-round humanist education for students. This concept spread quickly 
around the globe and gave rise to the foundation of many universities of the same type (HU, 
2014a).   
However, the university suffered from a great loss of scientific potential during World War II. 
Moreover, in the post-war period it came to an increased Communist influence on the 
university which resulted in a split among staff and students and eventually the establishment 
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of the Freie Universität (Free University) of Berlin in 1948, which was located in the 
American sector of the city. Thereupon, the remaining part of the Friedrich-Wilhelms 
University was given the name of the brothers Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt in 
1949. Despite the ideals of its name givers, it became difficult to keep up the former academic 
traditions under the Communist regime and the drastic higher education reforms in the 
German Democratic Republic in the years 1950/51 and 1967/68. Those reforms changed not 
only the content and structures of the degree courses, but they also forced its research 
activities to be aligned with the ruling ideology. Despite those difficult conditions, Humboldt 
University managed to keep up international contacts and contribute to the world-wide 
research community. Today the university states that it “has always been true to its principles, 
considering research and teaching as a unity […] in spite of its turbulent history over several 
decades” (HU, 2014a). 
After the German unification in 1990, the two formerly united universities decided to stay 
separate and Humboldt University entered into a “building up phase” in which large amounts 
of money were invested in reforming and rebuilding former capacities of the university. This 
major reorganization took place with help of an external Commission comprised mainly of 
German academics from outside the university who supported Humboldt University to 
develop its own new academic structures. This included not only the reevaluation of the 
degree programs, but also a quite rigid investigation of the personal and academic 
qualification of the current staff. In 1990 all professors of the Humboldt University had to 
undergo appointment procedures and a large number failed to sustain their position and were 
replaced by professors from West Germany. In many cases positions were not reappointed at 
all due to financial restrictions, which led to a drastic reduction of staff in the aftermath of the 
reunification (HU, 2014a).   
4.3.2 Relationship between Berlin Government and 
university 
In order to understand the organizational changes within the university, it is important to 
delineate the changes that have been taking place in the institutional environment. The 
Excellence Initiative was only one of many external influences and should be seen in the 
context of the political developments in Germany and in Berlin in the last decades. Berlin is 
in so far a special case in Germany, as it accommodates two comprehensive universities and 
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one large technical university within its city borders. From this follows that the coordination 
between the universities plays a much more central role than in regions where there is only 
one large university. In the case of Berlin this coordination was all the more relevant as the 
Freie Universtiy (FU) in the former West of Germany and the HU in the former East had to 
deal with many parallel structures and overlaps after the reunification. Both in West and East 
Germany the link between universities and their Länder Governments has traditionally been 
very strong.  
Introduction of steering by contract in 1998 and budget cuts  
In Berlin the relationship between Government and universities changed in 1997 when the 
new Berlin Budget Structure Law (Haushaltsstrukurgesetz, HStrG 97) enabled Berlin 
Government to start signing contracts with the universities in Berlin. This provided them with 
a budget over several years which they were able to use more or less autonomously, as long as 
they fulfilled the targets they had agreed upon in the contract. This reform took place because 
the Berlin higher education institutions complained about the unpredictability of the funding 
they received from Berlin Government. HU which was still dealing with the aftermath of its 
dramatic restructuring and staff reduction (about 23% between 1993 and 2000) after the 
German Reunification in 1991 was particularly dependent on stable and predictable funding 
in order to successfully establish modern and efficient structures that were able to compete 
with the more experienced counterparts in the West (SP, 1998).  
As the financial situation in the Land Berlin was difficult at that time, all higher education 
institutions were facing major budget cuts in 1997-2000 which led to further reduction of the 
staff (SP, 1998). The first contract was signed for the years 1997-2000 and included an 
incrementally decreasing annual budget for all higher education institutions in Berlin. In spite 
of the budget cuts, the universities perceived the four year binding contract as a great 
improvement which was seen as the prerequisite to be able to plan on a longer term. In return 
for this four year contract Berlin Government asked the universities to provide a Structural 
Plan in which they were supposed to outline how they were planning to develop their internal 
structure and research profile. This was done by giving detailed information on the 
development of the number and denomination of all professorships and which department and 
faculty they were going to be assigned to. The first Structural Plan for the years 1998 to 2004 
can therefore be considered the first concrete strategic planning document of HU. 
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A second round of budget cuts hit the Berlin universities in 2003 just before the second 
Structural Plan was due in 2004. HU met the budget cuts by further reducing its staff numbers 
and cutting down 20% of its professorships in its Structural Plan. The need to lean down 
internal structures and to coordinate more with the other higher education institutions in 
Berlin in order to meet the budget cuts led to many changes within HU. However during the 
next years from 2003 – 2010 the university was mainly concerned with reducing the large 
numbers of surplus permanent staff which it was obliged to employ due to strict labor laws, 
but which was not suitable to fill any of the positions stated in the official Structural Plan. The 
obligation to further employ this surplus staff led to a large budget gap and caused many of 
the actually planned positions to stay vacant until the numbers of surplus staff were slowly 
reduced either through retirement, termination, re-qualification or by exchanging staff with 
other universities in Berlin. While in 2006 HU had still 400 surplus positions to be financed, 
by 2010 the number of surplus positions had gone down so far that the actual structural plan 
could be more or less fulfilled. As a consequence in the years before 2010 the human resource 
policies were strictly aimed on reducing the surplus, which limited the room to maneuver with 
regard to creating new positions to a considerable extent (HU06).  This led to the situation 
that HU had a structural planning document but was not able to fully implement it due to the 
strict protective labor laws it had to follow. This caused a critical situation with regard to the 
strategic acting capability of HU in the forefront of 2005 when the Excellence Initiative 
entered the picture. 
In general it is obvious that since the introduction of the University Contracts in 1998 the 
budget provided by the Government has continuously decreased, and the universities have 
become more and more dependent on third-party funding. This dependency is seen critical 
within the university and fear is omnipresent with regard to the year 2018 when the funding 
through the Excellence Initiative will end. Members of HU are nervously following the 
formal and informal news they hear from Berlin Government about the time after the 
Excellence Initiative and all of them are pessimistic about the chances that the basic funding 
provided by the Government might be increased to relieve the universities from the pressure 
of applying for third-party funding. This attitude is not surprising, as the Government so far 
has rather followed the path of investing into temporary incentives to make the universities 
more competitive in the race for external money, for example by providing “application 
support funding” for the Excellence Initiative (RB 2010). 
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Introduction of performance-based budget appropriation in 2003 
Another major change in the relationship between Berlin Government and the universities in 
Berlin took place when Berlin Government decided to introduce a performance-based budget 
appropriation system with the new contract in 2003, in which initially 6 % of the total budget 
to Berlin universities was distributed according to different performance indicators in 
teaching, research and equal opportunities (HV 2003). In the subsequent contracts this 
percentage was incrementally increased up till 30% in 2008 (HV 2006). After having been 
evaluated positively by the Government, this system was further developed in 2012 after 
which the total budget is now distributed according to a formula that has been developed by 
the Government. Even though the universities were asked to develop individualized indicators 
for such a formula themselves, eventually the proposals were rejected and the Government 
implemented its own model (RB 2009). The complexity of this new system has made it 
necessary to enlarge the quality management office at HU in order to be able to carefully 
collect and provide all data necessary in order to achieve the best results possible in the 
annual evaluation which now has become decisive for the whole budget.  
Berlin Government’s steering through funding instruments 
For a long time the only steering that took place in Berlin’s higher education system was the 
steering over the contracts with the universities. The government had no financial incentive 
system to steer the scientific developments based on the needs of the region 
(Wissenschaftsrat, 2000). However, this has changed in the last years and several instruments 
have been implemented that have increased the steering abilities of Berlin Government.  In 
2008 it developed a funding program which was called “Masterplan Berlin – Knowledge 
shapes Berlin’s future” and provided a 150 million Euro for several projects that were 
supposed to increase the number and quality of study places in Berlin higher education 
institutions. One focus was on the support of projects that had not been successful in the first 
and second round of the Excellence Initiative. Part of this money was invested into the 
Einstein Foundation Berlin that was established in 2009. It aims at promoting excellent 
research in Berlin and is funded both through endowments and funding by Berlin 
Government. Both Masterplan and Einstein Foundation made it possible for the Berlin 
Government to provide incentives that allowed it to steer the universities a bit more according 
to its political agenda. 
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4.3.3 Generational change and personnel 
development 
HU is going through a generational change since the turn of the millennium. Many of the 
professors who had been appointed in the beginning of 1990 were reaching retirement age and 
while their chairs were often not reappointed in the times of austerity after 2004, from 2010 
on the on-going retirement waves gave room to the faculties and departments to reconsider 
their profile and to strategically appoint new professors. In 2002 the German Pension Law 
was reformed which led to two major changes for the human resource policies in German 
universities. First, the new staff category of junior professors was introduced which is a 
temporary professorship with a 6 year contract given to junior academics who have not yet 
been employed at a German university for longer than 6 years in total. Junior professors are 
independent and not affiliated to a senior professor. In the same reform a more flexible salary 
system was introduced for professors which gave the possibility to universities to base parts 
of the salary on performance while at the same time the professors now were able to negotiate 
for their salary during the appointment procedures. Being faced with the large numbers of 
retirements, HU took the opportunity that arose from the new staff category and created large 
numbers of junior professorships that were in most cases positioned at departments in which a 
full professorship would get vacant within the next 6 years. In the first years after 2002 HU 
was in fact the university with the largest number of junior professors in whole Germany. 
While the overall attitude against the introduction of junior professors was without exception 
positive, several respondents criticized that no real tenure track was provided to the junior 
professors which would have helped against the general problem in Germany that academic 
careers are rather unattractive due to the long insecurity of temporary contracts (HU04; 
HU02). However, this seems to be a topic that is currently extensively discussed in human 
resource policies (HU02).  
In general, the generational change is being seen as an opportunity to shape the profile of the 
departments and the university as a whole. The presidium has urged the faculties to develop a 
clear direction of where they want to develop their profile and to consider in how far they can 
contribute to the growth of the whole university (HU01). While it was normal in the past to 
simply reappoint the same professorship with the same denomination, the departments and 
faculties are now paying much more attention to the fitting of the professorship into their 
targeted profile. In strategic consultations the presidium requests detailed explanations for the 
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choices that have been made and some departments get external expertise to map out their 
strengths and expected developments in their field (HU05). The willingness of the faculty to 
spend so much effort in order to make sure to reappoint vacant professorships strategically 
and in the most beneficial direction for the department seems to be driven by the concern of 
being one of the “weak” departments that might be affected in case of possible budget cuts in 
the future. 
4.3.4 Organizational structure 
As of 2013, HU consisted of ten faculties in all major academic disciplines in the Arts and 
Humanities, in Social Science, Cultural Science, Human Medicine, Agricultural Science, 
Mathematics and the Natural Sciences. Six of the faculties are divided into several 
departments, while four faculties are so-called mono faculties with only one subject and no 
departmental level. In addition to the regular faculties, there is a variety of other scientific 
institutions within the university, the most relevant for this case study being Excellence 
Clusters and the Graduate Schools that receive funding from the Excellence Initiative. As of 
2013, there are four Excellence Cluster and eight Graduate Schools in a variety of mostly 
interdisciplinary subjects
1
. Both Clusters and Graduate Schools are part of the respective 
faculty from which the initiative emerged and the appointed professors within each of those 
structures are partly financed by this faculty. On 1 April 2014 HU implemented the first phase 
of a faculty reform
2
 in which the departments are being rearranged and allocated to a new 
organizational structure. The number of faculties is thereby being reduced to nine
3
. The 
faculty reform is part of the propositions made in the Institutional Strategy of the university 
which was awarded with funding from the Excellence Initiative (HU Institutional Strategy, 
2012). 
4.3.5 University governance 
There have been many changes in university governance over the last decades. Even though 
the focus of this thesis is on the changes after 2005, it is important to take into consideration 
the changes that have taken place since 1997 which was the year in which Berlin Government 
begun steering the Berlin universities by four-year contracts and the universities were given 
                                                 
1
 Retrieved on 9.4.2014 from http://www.exzellenz.hu-berlin.de/index-en  
2
 Retrieved on 9.4.2014 from http://www.hu-berlin.de/pr/pressemitteilungen/pm1403/pm_140327_00 
3
 Retrieved on 9.4.2014 from http://www.hu-berlin.de/institutions/faculties-and-departments 
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more leeway by an article which enabled them to try out new governance and leadership 
models. At the same time the severe budget cuts during 1997-2006 also had great implications 
on the way the HU was organized and governed internally. Therefore it would unwise to draw 
a line in 2005 and ignore the changes that have been taken place before, which is why they 
will be included in this section. 
 
University leadership 
Other than most German universities with a double structure with a rector and a chancellor, 
the Humboldt University is led by a single structure management, which is comprised of only 
one president with support of three vice-presidents. The HU was governed by the traditional 
dual leadership principle with one president and two vice-presidents as the academic heads 
and a chancellor as the administrative head until 1999. The president and the vice-president 
were appointed for only 4 or 2 years respectively and in case of the vice-presidents, they 
performed their tasks only extra-official. The chancellor on the other hand was appointed for 
12 years on a full-time position. However, this model was perceived problematic, because the 
chancellor had too much power and the areas teaching and research received not enough 
attention due to the part-time model of the vice-presidents (HU05). Through the reform of the 
presidium, the chancellor was abolished or rather transformed into a vice-president for finance 
and personnel who had equal standing with the other vice-presidents who now all held full-
time positions. At the same time the presidential term was adjusted and both president and 
vice-president are elected for 5 years. The idea was to make the university leadership more 
able to act strategic and to become more professional. Moreover, the university leadership, 
who had initiated this reform, saw the necessity to develop a clear strategy in both areas of 
teaching and research, especially with the Bologna reform coming up back in 2000. In fact, 
the HU was one of the first universities in Germany that had restructured their leadership 
model in that way and it was considered a very innovative idea back at that time (HU05). In 
fact HU was the first university in Germany that abolished the position of the chancellor
4
.  
                                                 
4
 Article in Berliner Zeitiung: http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/die-humboldt-universitaet-beraet-ihre-
verfassung--will-assistenzprofessuren-und-plant-eine-regatta-bewegung-ist-alles,10810590,9660868.html, 
retrieved 28.04.2014 
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In the current structure, each of the vice-presidents and the president has an office which is in 
charge of a number of administrative units of the university. The president’s office includes 
the Governing Bodies Office, the Press and Public Relations Office, the Strategic Planning 
Office and the International Strategy Office. The office of the Vice-President for Academic 
and International Affairs includes the Student Administration, the Quality Management, the 
International Office, the Language Center and the Sports Center. The office of the Vice-
President for Research includes the Research Service Center, the Humboldt Graduate School, 
the University Library and the Computer and Media Service. And the office of the Vice-
President for Finance, Personnel and Technical Matters includes the Financial Division, the 
Personnel Division, the Technical Division and the Legal Department.  
Governing bodies at university level 
The governing bodies
5
 at HU comprise of the Academic Council (Konzil), the Board of 
Trustees (Kuratorium) and the University Senate (Akademischer Senat). The Academic 
Council is the highest governing body of the university and is composed of 61 members, 
which include the whole University Senate plus 18 additional professors, 6 representatives of 
each the academic staff, the administrative staff and the students. It takes decisions regarding 
the legal framework and governance of the university and elects the president and vice-
presidents based on the recommendations of the Board of Trustees. The University Senate 
consists of 25 members, of whom 13 are professors. The rest are 4 representatives of each 
academic staff, administrative staff and students. It is responsible for decisions concerning the 
daily business and routines of the university, such as internal organization, research profiling 
and the development of study programs. The Board of Trustees consists of nine members, 
who are elected by the University Senate. Moreover, the Board always includes the president 
of the university and a ministerial representative of the Länder government of Berlin (Berliner 
Senat). It has an advisory role in more general strategic decisions and is the highest authority 
with regard to the decision about the budget and changes in internal organization, study 
programs and personnel planning. It can be considered the link between the Länder 
government of Berlin and HU. 
There have been several changes in HU’s governing bodies over the last decades. Only half a 
year after the Berlin Budget Structure Law had been changed in 1997, the HU took the newly 
                                                 
5
 Retrieved on 9.4.2014 from http://gremien.hu-berlin.de/  
54 
 
granted opportunity of the “trial article” to “try out new leadership and decision structures” 
which led to a new preliminary constitution in 1997 (BerlHG, 2003, § 7a). The first change 
was the reduction of the Board of Trustees from 22 to 9 members. The Board of Trustees was 
now also granted more decision-making authority which had formerly been in the hands of 
the University Senate and Berlin Government. Another change was the delegation of 
authority from the University Senate to its sub-commissions, from the faculties to their deans 
and from the departments to their department heads, thereby initiating a slow progress to a 
more centrally governed university (SP, 1998). After a trial period each of those changes was 
evaluated and in case of approval integrated in the University Constitution by authority of the 
University Council. Those constitutional changes have led to a strengthening of the university 
leadership and the deans and their ability to work strategically. 
Governing bodies at faculty and department level 
The nine faculties are governed by the Faculty Council which is composed of either thirteen 
or nineteen members, depending on the size and subject variety of the faculty. Over half of 
the members are professors, the other half is divided equally among the academic employees, 
administrative employees and students. The Faculty Council decides on all matters regarding 
internal organization, personnel, curriculum and research within the whole faculty. Moreover, 
it elects the dean and two vice-deans who are responsible for the daily operations within the 
faculty.  
The departments within the faculties are governed by the same principle as the overarching 
faculty. It is comprised of a Department Council which is in general composed of 7 members, 
unless the department has less than four professors. Over half of the members are professors, 
the other half is divided equally among the academic employees, administrative employees 
and students. This Council decides on all matters regarding internal organization, personnel, 
curriculum and research within the department. Moreover, it elects an executive director and 
two substitute directors who are responsible for the daily operations of the department. It is 
important to mention that the final decisions in personnel matters lay at the department level. 
4.3.6 Facts and Figures 
This section presents the current facts and figures of the relevant background information of 
HU collected from the websites of the university (HU, 2014b). As of 2013, HU offered 185 
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degree programs and enrolled 33,540 students. Moreover, it has a total staff count of 2287, 
out of which 415 are professors.  
Table 6: Student numbers Humboldt University, Oct 2013 
Students 
As of October 2013 
Total 33,540  
 Female students 19,344 
Male students 14,196 
International students 5,178 
 
Table 7: Students Humboldt University 2000-2012 
 
Table 8: Staff numbers Humboldt University 
Staff 
As of April 2014 
Total 2287  
 Professors 415 
Administrative staff 1193 
Lecturers and research assistants (Mittelbau), permanent 281 
Lecturers and research assistants (Mittelbau), temporary 398 
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Table 9: Staff Humboldt University per category 2000-2014 
 
The total budget of HU in 2012 was € 338,4 million. It is composed of about € 235 million in 
governmental grants and € 88 million in third-party funding. The expenditure of third-party 
funding has more than doubled since 2003. In the last approval ranking of the German 
Research Foundation, HU reached rank 8 based on the DFG funding of € 179.8 million it 
received between 2008 and 2010. Those numbers include the funding that was received 
through the Excellence Initiative. When disregarding the Excellence Initiative, HU takes place 
5 in the ranking, which means it has been effective in attracting funding also beyond the 
Excellence Initiative (HU, 2014c). However, when considering the reputation of HU in the 
German higher education community for being a top-notch university and its image of being 
the “mother of the modern university”, it is rather surprising that is can’t be found further up 
in those rankings.   
Table 10: Budget Humboldt University 
Budget  
(without Medical school) 
As of October, 2012 
Total 
 
€ 338,4 million 
 Governmental grants € 235,4 million 
Third-party funds € 87,957 million 
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Table 11: Development of third-party funding of Humboldt University 2003-2012 
  
Table 12: Third-party funding per faculty plus ExIni 2008-2012 (in million Euro) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Faculty for Math and Natural Sciences I 18,82 19,60 21,70 22,29 22,68 
Faculty for Math and Natural Sciences II 9,19 9,98 10,43 10,88 12,04 
Faculty of Philosophy I 4,30 5,25 5,87 6,56 6,96 
Faculty of Philosophy II 2,95 2,97 3,64 4,05 4,53 
Faculty of Philosophy III 4,76 5,60 8,10 9,02 10,23 
Faculty of Philosophy IV 6,49 7,82 4,13 4,74 2,93 
Faculty of Economics 3,55 3,00 2,94 2,74 3,18 
Faculty of Agriculture 3,71 4,35 5,06 5,34 5,91 
Faculty of Law 1,94 1,87 1,91 2,05 2,35 
Faculty of Theology 0,59 0,84 1,00 1,05 1,11 
Excellence Initiative 3,39 5,77 8,28 8,02 8,16 
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Table 13: Funding per source 2008-2012 
 
*DFG = Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Reseach Foundation) 
**DAAD = Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service) 
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Federal
Government
Foundations EU Industry DAAD Other
2008 31,26 11,65 5,69 4,49 3,99 2,11 6,44
2009 34,14 16,25 6,27 4,97 3,72 2,59 8,49
2010 37,2 24,87 10,71 5,61 4,67 2,87 3,15
2011 37,12 19,81 7,48 6,22 3,94 2,62 4,06
2012 43,78 17,32 9,09 7,15 3,83 2,76 2,99
Funding per source 2008-2012, not including medical school (in 
million Euro) 
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5 Findings 
The first step in this analysis was the extraction of chronological events and actual 
organizational changes that took place in the three areas of interest (governance, human 
resource policies, research). The information about changes that have taken place in HU over 
the last ten years is rich and in most parts the information from the different sources was 
coherent. This can be seen as an indicator that the findings can be considered valid and 
appropriate representatives of the actual changes that have been taking place. In particular the 
yearly performance reports provided by the presidium of the Humboldt University were 
helpful in tracking changes that have been taking place in various areas. Moreover, the 
document of the Institutional Strategy gave an indication which of the changes took place in 
the context of the Excellence Initiative. In addition, the interviews gave valuable information 
on informal changes that have not entered the official reports and they helped to shed light on 
the underlying rationales of these changes. Finally, the analysis will show patterns in the 
strategic behavior and provide an interpretation of how these changes relate to the Excellence 
Initiative. The chapter concludes in an overview of the types of strategic responses that have 
been identified and an interpretation will be given to what extent they emerged from 
institutional dynamics or were triggered deliberately by strategic actors.  
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5.1 Internal governance 
5.1.1 Structure 
The current governance reform at HU pursues the strengthening of the university and faculty 
leadership. It is being incrementally implemented since 2012 as an explicit part of the 
Institutional Strategy that is being funded through the Excellence Initiative. The rationale 
behind the governance reform is to create a “culture of enablement” within the university, 
which follows the idea that research can only work effectively if the service and 
administration is being developed in a way that researchers are being unburdened from as 
many administrative tasks as possible (HU Institutional Strategy, 2012). The elements of the 
governance reform are three-fold: A structural and functional reform of the faculties, the 
strengthening of the deans and a reform of the administration through organizational and 
personnel development. 
The faculty reform aimed at renewing functions and structures of the faculties in order to 
involve them more in the overall development of the university which is perceived as 
essential in times of rapid developments in the knowledge society. The faculties are supposed 
to become more strategic partners for the presidium in the sense of an extended university 
leadership and the reorganization is supposed to advance the research profiling of the whole 
university (RB 2012). As of April 2014, the first phase of the faculty reform has been 
implemented in which 6 of the in total 11 faculties have merged into 3 larger faculties. It is 
remarkable that the restructuring of faculties has in fact been discussed for over ten years 
already and several attempts had been stopped due to resistance in the University Senate 
(HU08). In general, the skepticism among the university members with regard to usefulness 
of the governance reform is still large, even though it differs greatly among faculties and 
employees group (HU05; HU08). Especially when the performance and efficiency of the own 
faculty was perceived as positive and satisfactory, the skepticism against a reform that would 
destroy the well-established traditions and structures of the own faculty, was great (HU01). 
However, there were also supporters who saw a great potential of synergetic effects and of the 
professionalization and standardization of administrative processes that took place due to the 
merger (HU05, HU06). By enlarging the organizational structures of some of the faculties, a 
potential is seen in centralizing the resource distribution and steering the faculty more 
strategically in a smaller team (HU05). However, the opinion about the faculty reform is 
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ambiguous and actual effects were not yet observable as it had taken place in the same month 
of the conduced interviews. 
The strengthening of the deans was first and foremost attempted by giving them a budget 
which they can distribute within their faculty to research and reform projects that they regard 
as worthy of support. Already in 2007 a Concilium Decanale has been established in 
preparation of the first full application to the Excellence Initiative, which includes the deans 
and was thought to be a consultative body of the presidium in the sense of an extended 
university leadership. However, as no adjustments were implemented in the constitution that 
granted any decision-making rights to the Concilium, it has been criticized to be a rather 
useless panel in which the deans are not really included in decision-making (HU06). 
Nonetheless, one respondent claimed that a positive development is seen over the last two 
years in which the Concilium has turned into a useful platform where internal resource 
distribution and procedures concerning the whole university are discussed (HU05). One 
respondent remarked that even though the governance reform had the clear aim of 
strengthening the power and influence of the deans, this did not really take place because 
there is a common belief that this is something “you don’t do in a democratic university” 
(HU05). The traditional model of primus inter pares is so prominent HU, that is seems 
unthinkable to implement a change in the constitution that would formally raise the deans 
over their peers.  
The third part of the governance reform was the reform of the administration. This was 
greeted as a very necessary change, as the administrative processes at HU were perceived as 
particularly bureaucratic and complicated, which is partly due to the past of being a university 
in the highly bureaucratic GDR (HU03). In a first step the former research department was 
transformed into the Service Centre Research in 2012 which at first was only comprised of an 
organizational restructuring into a so-called “one-stop-shop” that provides service to any 
phase of application and implementation for research projects. This restructuring took place 
under the direction of a new department head who was hired from another university and is 
perceived as a very able and strategic actor (HU10). In order to increase the service-
orientation and efficiency, a personnel development concept has been developed that includes 
instruments like management trainings, job rotation and long-term personnel concepts. 
However, a respondent has stated that those changes have so far not been noticeable (HU10). 
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5.1.2 Decision-making processes 
Leadership 
The role of the president and the vice-presidents in HU has changed over the last decade. Not 
only has the authority of the presidium slowly increased since the reform of the HU 
constitution  in 1998, but also the perception of the role of the president seems to have 
changed. First of all it is interesting to point out that in the history of the modern HU, there 
has been no president who has ever renewed his or her contract after the first period. As put 
by a respondent, “HU has a bad reputation of the sort that the presidents stand no chance 
against the strong resistance of single prominent professors and the faculties” (HU09). Many 
members of HU seem to be sensitively aware of this and it seems to have influenced former 
decisions in the University Senate in which members had voted for something they actually 
didn’t agree with, only in order to keep the president from resigning as this would have let 
HU appear in a bad light (HU09).  
Against this background it is not surprising that almost every presidium has tried to increase 
its influence in the decision-making process within the university in formal or informal ways. 
An example is the increased amount of budget the president can decide to spend for projects 
he supports personally. Another informal change took place in the appointment procedures in 
which one former president introduced an additional step in which he revised the candidate 
lists of the faculties before passing them on to the University Senate for approval (HU07). An 
interesting observation of one of the respondents was that the current president tries to 
influence the university by transforming the structures in a way that he thinks would help to 
make the university more steerable (HU09). Another change that has taken place is the more 
explicit communication of goals of the presidium in documents like the annual performance 
reports or even an explicit program of the presidium for its period of office.  
It has been stated several times that the influence of the presidium does depend greatly on the 
person and his or her leadership style. While some presidents were perceived as dominant and 
making mostly top-down decisions, other presidents were said to base their decisions more on 
the opinions represented in the University Senate. This is in particular interesting as it has 
been suggested on several accounts that the first two times the HU applied unsuccessfully 
with an Institutional Strategy in the Excellence Initiative, the failure might have been related 
to the leadership style of the presidium and the top-down development of a concept which 
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didn’t include all opinions and needs of the different member groups of the university and 
therefore didn’t get full support from the own university (HU07). Between the unsuccessful 
first two rounds and the success in the third round a change took place in the presidium in 
2010. As stated by one respondent, the contrast couldn’t have been greater. While the former 
president was a brilliant renowned scientist who was perceived as too impatient to lead such a 
bottom-heavy and tenacious university, the successor was maybe less prominent as a scientist 
but had experience in management and steering from his former political career as a minister 
(HU09). The same respondent speculated that the concept of the third round was successful 
because the visions of the new president matched the ideas of the policy-makers with regard 
to the university paradigm that was underlying the whole Excellence Initiative. Having 
learned from the difficulties in the first two rounds, the preparation of the third round was 
carried out in a much more inclusive and communicative way. A Task Force Excellence 
Initiative was set up which at first only included professors who supported the new presidium 
in developing a new draft. Soon this was transformed into the Forum Excellence Initiative 
(FOX), which included representatives of all member groups of the university and which had 
four separate working groups for the main areas that were intended to be the focus of the new 
draft (RB2010). An interesting comment was that the learning didn’t only take place in the 
leadership but also at the basis of the university which was heart-stricken that its beloved 
institution had been rejected even though everybody had in an almost arrogant way 
considered the success as set (HU09). This consternation was even more fueled by the fact 
that Free University, the main competitor in Berlin, had managed to enter the “circle of elite 
universities” (HU09). 
In general the awareness of how important leadership can be, seems to have increased over 
the last decade. In this context it is interesting to mention that in 2007 a first survey regarding 
the topic “leadership” was conducted among all university employees. The participation rate 
was unusually high and in particular in the central university administration the results were 
discussed in workshops that led to some guidelines that were meant to improve the efficiency 
and communication of the management (RB 2008).  
Governing boards 
As in most German universities, almost all decision-making power at HU lays at the bottom 
of the university, as most decisions need to be approved by the University Senate or the 
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Council in which the different member groups are represented. As described by a respondent, 
those governing boards are the ”sounding board of the university which is where you have to 
communicate your strategy early enough and adapt it in a way that it is acceptable for 
everyone” (HU05). While this model is very common in Germany, many respondents have 
pointed out particular difficulties in the governance at HU. One respondent claimed that there 
often seems to be little rationality in the decision-making process within these boards, as 
some people are sometimes “simply against it and do not keep their word, even if they have 
earlier agreed on the same matter” (HU05). Moreover, several respondents pointed out the 
struggle between the University Senate and some individual professors at HU who are 
prominent and internationally renowned and have a certain influence due to their success in 
attracting third-party funding (HU07, HU05). Research activities at HU have always been 
characterized by the excellent performance of individual researchers, which is reflected in the 
high amount of individual funding like through Leibnitz prices or ERC Advanced Investigator 
Grants (LB 2011). While those individual researchers seem to be considered as an essential 
part of the success of HU in the past and are clearly regarded with a certain pride, it also has 
been mentioned that large parts of the University Senate are not happy about the 
disproportional influence of those “prominent figures” (HU07). 
While some respondents are skeptical if any change has taken place within the decision-
making process of the governance boards within HU, in overall there seems to be a slight 
tendency of being more willing of accepting compromises. At the same time, in particular 
smaller decisions with regards to the implementation of the Excellence Initiative have been 
delegated to the presidium who now consults with smaller committees, such as the internal 
“Standing Consulting Committee” for the Excellence Initiative and the “Scientific Advisory 
Board” of external experts. This development seems to be related to the trust the University 
Senate seems to have developed against the presidium during the successful application 
process. An interesting observation by a respondent in this regard was that after the failure of 
the first two rounds of the Excellence Initiative, the shared effort of everyone to develop a 
new concept in order to succeed next time seemed to have influenced the feeling of 
identification with the institution HU. It was argued that due to the drastic budget cuts and 
restructuring in the years before 2006 the university had more or less lost sight of its identity. 
However, in the time after the rejection and in particular during the 200-anniversary in 2010 
many internal and external events reminded the university members of the values of the 
Humboldtian model and which elements had made the university excellent in the past. This 
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seems to have changed the attitude of many people within HU who are now more willing to 
pull together and spend more time and effort on thinking about strategy in order to succeed in 
the next round (HU09). This was for example noticeable in the much larger number of 
initiatives for Excellence Clusters and Graduate Schools that were presented to the presidium 
in the forefront of the third round. 
5.2 Human resource policies 
5.2.1 Planning of professorial positions 
One part of the contracts with Berlin Government is the requirement that HU provides so-
called structural plans in which it states number and denomination of the professors in each 
faculty and department, as well as the number of other academic and  administrative staff. The 
current plan dates back to 2004 and even though HU was supposed to provide a new plan in 
2010 this has not yet taken place. One explanation for this delay is that the application and 
implementation of the Excellence Initiative have taken up so much time and administrative 
resources that the renewal of the structural plan needed to be postponed (HU05). Another 
reason is the fact that the structural plan needs to take into account to which extent the Federal 
and the Berlin Government will replace the additional funding of the Excellence Initiative 
after the end of the funding period in 2017, which has not been decided upon yet (LB 2011). 
The concern of the new structural plan bringing once again severe structural changes is very 
present among the university members who remember clearly the consequences that came 
through the budget cuts in 2003 and the structural plan of 2004 in which the staff had 
drastically reduced by about 25%, including the complete abolishment of several 
professorships. As claimed by one respondent, this staff reduction process has leaned down 
the university to such a degree that barely any potential for further optimization is left in case 
of further budget cuts (HU06).  
5.2.2 Salary policies 
The flexibilization of professor salaries in Germany that took place in 2002 is being perceived 
as problematic within HU as they have led to some difficult consequences for the university. 
Due to the different financial situation of the different Länder, in Bavaria a full senior 
professor gets about 1000 Euro more basic salary than in Berlin which is at the bottom rank of 
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all German Länder (RB 2012). This makes it often difficult to attract top candidates to Berlin 
and there are indeed accounts of excellent professors HU had lost to Munich due to the better 
salary they had been offered at the Bavarian university (HU04). Especially against the 
backdrop of the limited time window of the current generational change in HU it is 
particularly important to attract excellent researchers for the vacant professorships, as they 
will most likely stay there for the rest of their career and determine the future profile and 
success of the university. Therefore it is seen as especially disadvantageous that the Berlin 
universities are starting off from a worse financial situation than many of their competitors in 
Germany. Nonetheless, some respondents pointed out that HU has still managed to recruit 
excellent staff which is partly owed to the attractiveness of the city of Berlin (HU09). 
Moreover, the additional funds of the Excellence Initiative have enabled HU to compensate 
for this structural disadvantage and large parts of the money are being invested in providing 
more attractive salaries and facilities. 
It is an interesting observation that the HU is one of the few universities in Germany that has 
chosen not to use the newly received possibility of basing the salary on upfront performance 
agreements. As explained by a respondent, the principle of trusting in the abilities of the 
academics was so deeply rooted within HU, that this was not even put up for discussion after 
the law had been reformed in 2002 (HU02). However, the new law still gave the possibility to 
the professors to bargain for higher salaries, especially in cases of a parallel call from another 
university. As a consequence, is has become common for German professors to frequently 
apply for other professorships only to increase the leverage they can use to bargain for better 
salaries and facilities at their home university. For those cases the presidium has a budget that 
can be used to meet particularly high demands of excellent “star” professors who HU doesn’t 
want to lose under any circumstances (HU04). Nonetheless, it is seen as very problematic that 
this leads to great differences in salaries within HU, especially because this kind of inequality 
has so far been rather unknown in German universities where the basic salaries were formerly 
independent of the actual performance of the individual academic (HU06; HU02). This is 
even further increased by the Excellence Initiative that provides high salaries and excellent 
research facilities to a number of academics, most of whom have been recruited for the new 
Excellence Clusters. At the same time, the departments of HU that are not affiliated to one of 
the heavily funded “excellent” structures, have only limited access to the additional money 
available through the Excellence Initiative, for example through one of the internal funding 
lines open for all departments. 
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5.2.3 Appointment procedures 
The appointment procedures have become more complex and it seems to be a central concern 
to ensure that all members of the appointment committees are completely independent and are 
not influenced by any personal relationship. In addition, the criteria of gender equality and 
teaching quality have become more important over the last decade (HU02). This development 
took place within the heads of the academics themselves and at the same time the pressure 
was increased from the leadership who increasingly faces the external demands by its 
stakeholders of providing a fair and transparent appointment procedure which is taking in 
account both teaching and research (HU02). This is reflected in the explicit focus of the 
Institutional Strategy on gender equality, which also led to the new regulation in the 
appointment procedures that at least two female professors need to be part of each 
appointment committee. Interestingly, this did not only have positive consequences for female 
academics, as in departments with very few female professors they need to be part of almost 
every committee which demands a lot of time and creates an unfair disadvantage to them 
(HU06). However, in some cases those regulations have actually led to strategic 
interdisciplinary cooperation between departments because in cases when there are too few 
female or unbiased professors available, another professor from another department needs to 
be invited into the committee who then can have a clear influence on the choice of candidate 
(HU06). This increasing complexity of the recruitment and appointment procedures has led to 
the establishment of administrative units for academic affairs at the different faculties which 
provide central support to the procedures and make sure the regulations are being followed 
(HU06). Even though the advantages of transparent procedures are being appreciated, the 
rigidity of the procedures and the regulations are said to make it sometimes difficult to get the 
best candidate for a position (HU04; HU03).  
One peculiarity in the appointment processes was mentioned as a consequence of the 
establishment of the Excellence Clusters. Through the additional money of the Excellence 
Initiative, many professors were appointed either temporally or on permanent professorships. 
As HU had chosen not to create independent organizational structures for the Excellence 
Clusters, each professor was hired through a department that was affiliated to the cluster. This 
meant that those professors had all the rights and obligations like any regular professors of 
that department. However, in the appointment procedures the appointment committee selected 
candidates that matched the profile of the Excellence Clusters while the profile of the 
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department was treated only subordinately. Due to the interdisciplinarity of the clusters this 
led to some cases in which professors were appointed for a cluster, while being affiliated to a 
department that didn’t match their own discipline. This was particularly difficult as this also 
entailed the supervision of students and even PhDs of different disciplines than the ones the 
professors had studied themselves (HU04). 
5.3 Research 
5.3.1 Funding 
Over the last decade a diversification took place with regard to external funding opportunities 
for the universities in Berlin. First, with the first funding period of the Excellence Initiative in 
2007 the German Research Foundation (DFG) began paying an overhead to all funded 
universities. Within HU this overhead is received by the faculties that either pass it directly on 
to the responsible department or keep a share of it in order to distribute it for central support, 
such as start-up financing of emerging research initiatives. Second, several additional external 
funding sources emerged in Berlin. Between 2008 and 2011 Berlin Government implemented 
the “Masterplan Berlin – Knowledge shapes Berlin’s future” which provided in total 150 
million Euro that were supposed to support excellent research in Berlin. Many initiatives of 
HU that had failed to win in the Excellence Initiative in the first two rounds received financial 
support in order to be implemented anyway or to be further developed in order to increase 
their chances in the next round. Part of the money was also intended for attracting excellent 
professors whose appointment was often linked to demands of high salaries and expensive 
research facilities that the universities couldn’t afford in the normal case. One original 
intention of the Masterplan was also the establishment of an overarching institution which 
would combine the excellent research of the universities and non-university institutions in 
Berlin. The so-called “Super University” was often mocked to be a personal project of the 
senator for science in the Berlin Government. It was perceived highly controversial and 
received very strong resistance from the universities
6
. In the end the project was given up and 
in 2009 the idea was transformed into the “Einstein Foundation” which was provided with a 
capital of 5 million Euro that is distributed through different funding lines among Berlin 
                                                 
6
 See Tagesspiegel, 22.10.2007: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/universitaet-kommt-die-super-uni-fuer-
berlin/1075764.html, retrieved 26.5.2014 
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higher education institutions in order to advance cooperation, international visibility and 
excellent research (Einstein Foundation, 2009). The “excellence rhetoric” of choosing names 
like Einstein or Super University for the political programs in Berlin is following the same 
paradigm that is underlying the Excellence Initiative. Being the capital of Germany and 
accommodating three large universities, Berlin feels clearly pressured to prove its relevance in 
Germany’s research community.  
In addition, internal funding opportunities for researchers at HU have increased as well. In the 
context of the Institutional Strategy a fund
7
 was set up that distributes money through eleven 
funding lines that aim for example at improving chances for young academics, supporting 
gender equality, promoting interdisciplinary cooperation or internationalization. An 
interesting observation of one respondent was that this has in a way created a “small DFG 
within HU” (HU10). Because this entailed the creation of a whole new set of application and 
decision-making procedures within the university, it was criticized by some as too resource-
consuming and pointless because it was simply creating a parallel structure to the DFG. 
However, one crucial difference is the influence the presidium has on the decisions made in 
the funding lines and it has indeed been suggested that sometimes the funding decisions are 
not merely based on academic merit, but follow also an internal political agenda (HU10). 
5.3.2 Interdisciplinarity 
One general development in the research profile of HU is the increase of interdisciplinary 
cooperation both within the university and with external institutions. In 2004 a new structure 
called Interdisciplinary Centres (IC) was introduced, by which it was attempted to counteract 
the rigid internal division of faculties and to enhance the visibility of the university profile 
(LB 2005). Between 2004 and 2006 ten new ICs were established. Another two ICs were 
established in 2007 (RB 2007). Some of those ICs were also transformed into Excellence 
Clusters after having provided an optimal environment for researchers to develop a successful 
application together (RB 2006). In general the ICs were perceived as effective incubators for 
applications to third-party funding (RB 2007). After a positive evaluation in 2009 it was 
decided to keep the concept of ICs and to integrate them into the newly emerging structure of 
Integreative Research Centres (IRI).  When the first Integrative Research Centre “IRIs for the 
Sciences in Adlershof” was established in 2009, two of the ICs were basically the two pillars 
                                                 
7
 http://www.exzellenz.hu-berlin.de/funding/standardseite?set_language=en&cl=en, retrieved 26.05.2014 
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which the IRI was based on (RB 2009).  The new IRIs were supposed to serve as a platform 
for interdisciplinary projects. After having centralized a large part of the natural sciences at 
one campus in the south of Berlin (Adlershof) in 2003, the successful emergence of the first 
IRI at this location was celebrated as a proof of the successful outcomes of the restructuring 
of the natural sciences that had been perceived critically in the beginning (RB 2006). In 2012, 
a second Integrative Research Centre was founded, i.e. the IRIs for Life Sciences which had 
the aim of strategically developing the Life Sciences at HU and to coordinate with the other 
universities and non-university institutions in Berlin. Even though it was not called an IRI, in 
this context it is also important to mention the Professional School of Education which was 
established in 2011 and which centralized the research and teaching in the HU teacher 
education and received further support through the Excellence Initiative (LB 2011).  
The Institutional Strategy built strongly on the concept of the IRIs and the arguments of the 
positive outcomes of the already existing IRIs were crucial for the success in the third round. 
As a consequence, in 2013 part of the Excellence Initiative grant was used to establish a third 
IRI on a topic combining Social Sciences and Natural Sciences. In overall the effect of the 
IRIs is seen as very positive among the university members. Several respondents have 
expressed their hope that the IRIs will have a “magnetic effect” and attract new excellent 
researchers as well as direct the research focus within the university into one centralized 
direction, thereby building critical mass which is needed to do excellent research (HU05). 
Especially for professors with very broad denominations the freedom of choosing their 
research focus is perceived as very large and it is assumed that the incentive of working 
together in a well-funded research center with good facilities will have this kind of magnetic 
effect on those professors. The same effect is expected from the Excellence Clusters. As the 
researchers who are mainly affiliated to the clusters have in general much lower teaching 
loads and can work much more intensely on their research, it is assumed that they will be 
more productive, thereby shaping the profile of the university (HU09). One critical voice 
pointed out that it is not enough to invest a lot of resources into three big IRIs in order to 
centralize research interests while not cutting down in other areas that are weaker at the same 
time. For this respondent it appeared as if only additional structures had been created, while 
nobody was brave enough to actually hurt other areas, even though this will inevitably 
become necessary in the future (HU10). Another critique is that the increased 
interdisciplinary research cooperation can also lead to increased tensions within the 
university. One account has been given of a department that was confronted with developing 
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their research focus into a direction they didn’t approve of, just because another department in 
an Excellence Cluster they were participating in was having such a strong influence on them 
(HU05). 
5.3.3 Cooperation 
HU was already active in cooperating with non-university institutions before the Excellence 
Initiative. One of the prevalent instruments in this context is the S-professorship which stands 
for “special professorship” and is given to professors who are also active researchers in other 
non-university institutions, whereby HU and the external institution share costs for the 
professorship. This instrument is used very strategically to establish close links to the 
excellent and often very well-funded external institutions. As stated in the performance report 
of 2007 the universities use S-professorships to change their personnel structures in an 
innovative way. This was further advanced through the establishment of Excellence Clusters 
through the Excellence Initiative, which are aimed at increasing cooperation with external 
institutions. Through the Institutional Strategy, HU aims at becoming a “role-model 
cooperative university” which it attempts by opening up the IRIs to external research partners. 
This also includes setting-up joint steering committees with non-university partners which 
provide guidance on all important matters regarding research collaboration, like for example 
academic profile, resources and personnel planning and cost sharing. They are supposed to 
advance the establishment and shared research infrastructures, common promotion of young 
researchers and collaboration in teaching (HU Institutional Strategy, 2012). Moreover, a 
Centre for Expertise for Cooperation in Academic Research has been established through the 
Excellence Initiative funding which supports members of HU in initiating collaborations by 
pooling administrative, financial and logistical resources for teaching and research (HU 
Institutional Strategy, 2012). 
Another change took place in 2012, when the cooperation with international partner 
institutions became more strategic in the way that a small number of international universities 
was selected with which the HU would build a particularly close and active partnership. 
About 25 universities were selected, first and foremost on basis of their international 
reputation and their similar research profile. However, some cooperation was included mainly 
because of the historical relationship to the university (LB 2011). Even though the decisions 
over the international partnerships have become more top-down, the Institutional Strategy 
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also grants additional funding for individual researchers to establish international 
collaborations from bottom-up, for example by organizing international summer schools or by 
providing visiting scholarships to international scholars (HU Institutional Strategy, 2012). In 
addition, the Institutional Strategy provides funding for International Officers at all faculties 
of HU who are serving as contact persons for all international matters. 
5.3.4 Doctoral education 
In general the number of structured graduate programs at HU has been increasing greatly 
since the beginning of the millennium. In 2006 HU had the largest number of DFG funded 
Graduate Colleges in Germany. In 2006 the Humboldt Graduate School was established, an 
internal umbrella organization for the various structured doctoral programs that have been 
established at HU since 2000. The aim of this Graduate School was not only to offer 
centralized support to the programs, but it also serves as a quality assurance instruments, 
because all doctoral programs have to fulfill a number of requirements in order to be accepted 
into the school. Those requirements are mainly related to competitiveness, transparence, 
internationality, chance equality and supervision. It is interesting to mention that the same 
kind of organization was introduced at the competitor FU during that time (LB 2006). It has 
been mentioned that the positive experiences HU had made with the HU Graduate School had 
a great impact on the central role the graduate education took in the Institutional Strategy (LB 
2011). An interesting observation is that the actual number of students in structured graduate 
programs is still much smaller than the number of individual doctoral students. However, it 
took some years before the individual doctoral students also got the ability to be included in 
the Humboldt Graduate School and to benefit from its infrastructure (LB 2011). As the 
structured doctoral programs are still an emerging phenomenon in German universities, this 
delay in integrating individual students into the benefits system of the Graduate School might 
be interpreted as an attempt to make the structural programs more attractive by providing 
clear advantages compared to the individual programs. Even though all respondents spoke 
positively of the activities aimed at improving the conditions for young academics, one 
critical respondent mentioned that it is not enough to only provide temporary support through 
the Excellence Initiative. It was suggested that this would only disguise the actual problems in 
the system, like the lack of security that was provided by the university to the young 
academics (HU08).  
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5.3.5 Quality 
HU was the first university in Germany that has introduced self-evaluation of its research 
areas in 2001. Originally the plan was to evaluate each discipline every five years through 
informed peer review and developing performance agreements with the departments 
according to the evaluations. Even though the outcomes of the evaluations were seen as very 
useful as a basis for strategic further development of the research profile, the evaluation 
process turned out to be too resource consuming in order to be kept up in its original 
frequency and degree of detail. Especially during the first application process of the 
Excellence Initiative the evaluations were paused due to a lack of resources. 
The situation changed in the time after the first failure in the Excellence Initiative. In 2008 a 
new Quality Management Office (QM Office) was set up in the central university 
management. The new QM Office centralized the research evaluation process and developed 
a new model of performance agreement in which all areas were agreed upon together, while at 
the same time extending the period of agreement and the reward in case of positive evaluation 
(RB 2009). The establishment of the new QM Office can be considered to be part of an 
emerging quality culture within HU and it is pointed out in the performance report of 2008 
that the advantages and usefulness of the new quality assurance measures are being 
understood and appreciated by the members of the university (RB 2008). However, in later 
accounts it becomes clear that some quality assurance measures such as benchmarking in the 
administration might have been conducted but results are often not implementable, apparently 
due to the lack of financial support (LB 2011). However, after the Institutional Strategy’s 
success in 2012 more money is invested in the quality assurance. For example, the QM Office 
has been extended by one academic senior advisor who is accompanying the implementation 
of the different funding lines of the Institutional Strategy with formative evaluations (HU09). 
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5.4 Patterns of strategic responses 
Table 14: Timeline of Developments 
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In general the findings indicate that several changes have happened since 2005 which are 
directly related to the implementation of the Excellence Initiative. Especially the changes 
which were initiated through the Institutional Strategy are a direct response to the policy 
instrument. However, there have also been other institutional developments that seem to have 
emerged in response to the Excellence Initiative, without being part of the official 
Institutional Strategy. This includes changes in the informal communication culture, 
perception of the role of the university leadership and institutional identity. In this section the 
organizational changes within HU will be interpreted according to the five dimensions by 
which the policy instrument Excellence Initiative is being characterized by Oliver (1991). 
Those dimensions are cause, constituents, content, control and context of the policy 
instrument. Thereby it will be possible to shed light on the relationship between Excellence 
Initiative and the actual changes that took place in the university.  
When looking at the rationale behind the Excellence Initiative it becomes clear that both 
economic and social fitness are being targeted. First, by giving incentives to the universities to 
become more efficient and produce better excellent research, one aim seems to be to make the 
universities better performers, even if the general budget is being cut. This would mean less 
economic burden for the government, while at the same time getting the expected high quality 
knowledge and expertise that is needed from the university in our knowledge society. At the 
same time the rationale behind the Excellence Initiative could be understood as an attempt to 
strengthen the legitimacy of German universities in German society. The German people are 
living in a more and more globalized world and the relevance and quality of universities on 
German soil is not only being compared to other German universities anymore. Instead, the 
competitors are everywhere and in order to assure their legitimacy German higher education 
institutions are pressured to prove their merit in comparison with top notch institutions 
worldwide. The rationale to make German universities more excellent and internationally 
visible can therefore be interpreted to be also aimed at increasing the social fitness of German 
universities. The response within HU to the Excellence Initiative varied depending on the 
angle from which this policy instrument was perceived. While the academics within HU seem 
to have a rather high opinion of the research performance of themselves and their peers, they 
nonetheless acknowledged the necessity of improving the internal structures to provide better 
conditions for conducting excellent research. Nobody seems to contest the fact that HU has 
some rather inefficient and therefore unnecessarily expensive structures, which is why 
economic fitness was seen as a legitimate goal that deserved to be supported. In contrast, it 
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was discussed very controversial within Germany if the Excellence Initiative had a positive 
impact on social fitness, as many people argued that the strength of the German higher 
education system actually lay within its equally distributed quality and the lack of horizontal 
differentiation. This controversy also seems to have taken place within HU at the beginning of 
the application process (HU09), but at the latest after the failure to receive “excellence status” 
in the second round of the Excellence Initiative it became obvious that the idea of being one 
of the top universities in Germany mattered a great deal to the members of HU.  
The obvious constituents of the Excellence Initiative are the Federal and the Länder 
Governments who clearly benefit from the Excellence Initiative, as it seems to have mobilized 
many positive changes within the universities that are now operating in a more efficient way.  
Other constituents are also the academics who benefit from the diversified funding 
possibilities and the students who find better conditions and facilities in the funded 
institutions. However, the groups of the academics and the students need to be divided into 
the “losers” and the “winners” of the Excellence Initiative and it has been criticized many 
times that the institutions that didn’t succeed in the competition, experienced an economic and 
social damage, as they had risked their reputation and resources without getting anything in 
return (Simon et al., 2010). The response to the Excellence Initiative within HU is clearly 
shaped by the often contrasting attitudes and interests of the different constituents that were 
openly battled out within the internal governing boards such as the University Senate. 
With regard to the content of the Excellence Initiative, it is interesting to examine the 
requirements that were prescribed by the policy makers concerning the three funding lines. 
While the Excellence Clusters clearly required the applying institutions to develop 
interdisciplinary research cooperation, the Graduate Schools demanded a more intense 
reflection of how to provide best possible education to junior academics. For the Institutional 
Strategy there  was in fact a template that was supposed to be used by the institutions and that 
was to cover the following areas like for example governance, internal research structures, 
development of junior academics, chance equality, external cooperation and ability to act 
strategically. Indeed HU covered all of those areas in its successful Institutional Strategy and 
it is an interesting question what role the template played in developing the strategy within 
HU. One respondent assumed that the template did indeed influence or rather restrict the 
development of the strategy to the areas suggested by the policy makers, even though this 
didn’t seem to have led to any complaints as the themes were accepted as appropriate anyway 
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(HU08). Another respondent had another interpretation, being that the suggested elements 
seemed to simply match the vision of the new presidium in a perfect way, which was also 
expected to be one of the major factors for the success (HU09). One can conclude that the 
response of HU to the Excellence Initiative was clearly facilitated by the fact that its content 
was met with approval within the university. 
With regard to the control means by which the Excellence Initiative was imposed on the 
German universities, it is clear that the implementation took mostly place by pressure for 
voluntary compliance. Even though there was no legal coercion that would have forced the 
institutions to take part in the competition, the participation rate was immense among the 
German universities which can be explained by the name and shame process that went along 
with the competition. The incentives of participating were both of financial and reputational 
nature and HU did clearly participate in response to these incentives. One account was given 
of a department that only developed a draft for a graduate school in the first round because it 
had heard that the other university in Berlin was preparing a similar application in the same 
discipline and it was worried to be perceived inferior to its competitor (HU09).  However, in 
the very beginning there seemed to have been discussions within HU if a participation was 
necessary and worth it at all, but this was abandoned at once when the first rumors from 
activities of competing universities emerged and it became clearer what the actual material 
benefits would be in case of a success (HU09). 
The context in which the Excellence Initiative was implemented helps understand the 
response of HU. The universities in Germany and in particular in the financially stricken 
Berlin are facing a very uncertain financial future. It is clear that the members of HU are very 
worried about the developments and the inability to predict what might happen. Against this 
backdrop the enthusiastic response to the Excellence Initiative always went hand in hand with 
a very critical view of the future. Even though the financial support HU gets through the 
Excellence Initiative is valued as a great help to improve the current conditions in the 
university, almost all respondents expressed their concerns about the possible consequences 
that will follow after the funding of the Excellence Initiative has ended. It is expected that 
there will be a hard struggle for resources among the colleagues which in the worst case might 
paralyze the university and undo many of the positive developments (HU09). 
The following table gives an overview of the organizational changes that have been identified, 
thereby uncovering patterns that might show if the changes have been triggered deliberately 
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or have rather emerged from within the institution. While it is clear that it is often impossible 
to identify one single external pressure that has led to a certain response, the table below 
attempts to give a simplified overview in which the most obvious pressure is mentioned 
without claiming its exclusivity. The same applies to the time period which in most cases is 
blurry and should only be understood as a point of chronological orientation.  
Table 15: Strategic responses to Excellence Initiative 
Change External pressure Type of response 
Changes in internal organization and governance  
Since 2006: More influence of 
presidium in appointment 
procedure 
Perception of presidium to 
have too little influence on 
decision-making 
Manipulate 
 
2007: Set up of Concilium 
Decanale 
Part of first application to 
Excellence Initiative 
Compromise 
 
2007: Change in preparation 
process for next round of 
Excellence Initiative 
Failure in first two rounds of 
Excellence Initiative 
Compromise 
2007: Employee survey on 
“leadership” 
Dissatisfaction with 
leadership structures among 
employees 
Compromise 
2008: Set up of Quality 
Management Office 
Emerging demands of quality 
assurance in environment 
Acquiesce 
2010: Expansion of Quality 
Management Office 
Increased complexity and 
importance of budget 
appropriation system 
Acquiesce 
  
2012: Development of faculty 
reform 
Part of the Institutional 
Strategy 
Manipulate 
2012: Only some of the faculties 
take part in faculty reform 
Faculty reform in context of 
Institutional Strategy 
Defy 
 
2012: Implementation of 
administration reform 
Part of the Institutional 
Strategy 
Compromise 
2012: More delegation of 
decision-making to presidium 
w.r.t. Excellence Initiative  
Reclaimed trust in presidium 
after success in third round of 
Excellence Initiative 
Compromise 
Changes in human resource policies 
2006: Increased Budget of 
presidium to meet particularly 
high demands of “star” 
researchers 
Increased competition over 
attracting best researchers 
Compromise 
Since 2010: Delay in update of 
structural plan 
Too little resources and 
planning security from 
Government 
Avoid 
 
2012: New rule that at least two 
women need to be in 
appointment committee 
Demand to increase the 
number of female professors 
Manipulate 
2012: Set up of administrative Increased complexity of Acquiesce 
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units for academic affairs to 
support appointment process 
appointment procedures  
Changes in research 
2006: Establishment of 
Humboldt Graduate School 
Demand to improve the 
quality of graduate education 
Acquiesce 
 
Since 2007: Introduction of 
reward and incentive systems 
for third-party funding 
Demand to increase third-
party funding due to budget 
cuts 
Acquiesce 
 
2008: Public denial of support 
of “Super Uni” idea of Berlin 
Government 
Idea of Berlin Government to 
develop an overarching 
“Super Uni” in Berlin 
Defy 
 
2009: Introduction of Integrative 
Research Centers (IRIs) 
Demand of more 
interdisciplinary research 
Manipulate 
 
2012: Investments into graduate 
education 
Institutional Strategy in 
context of Excellence 
Initiative 
Compromise 
2012: Focus of international 
cooperation on few partner 
universities 
Demand for more strategic 
international cooperation 
Defy 
2012: Set-up of joint steering 
committees with non-university 
partners 
Demand for more strategic 
international cooperation 
Manipulate 
2012: Establishment of Centre 
for Expertise for Cooperation in 
Academic Research 
Demand for more strategic 
international cooperation 
Manipulate 
This overview shows that all types of strategic responses can be observed within HU. When 
looking only at the strategies that were used since 2005, the following pattern emerges. In the 
time period 2005-2014, 10 strategies have been identified in the area of internal governance 
and organization, 4 in the area of human resource policies and 8 in the area of research. In 
particular the strategies compromise (7), manipulation (6) and acquiescence (5), have been 
used rather frequently, accounting for more than one third of the 22 identified strategies. The 
strategies avoidance (1) and defiance (3) have been less prevalent. According to Oliver’s 
(1991) typology, the strategies of acquiescence and compromise are typical in a highly 
institutionalized organization like the old and traditional HU, which is in line with the 
findings. However, there also seem to be several strategies in place where the environment is 
actively manipulated and institutional norms challenged. In the interviews it has become clear 
that there are great differences in the preferred responses among the different member groups 
of HU, in which some are deliberately trying to shape the environment and some are resisting 
against any change. Due to the democratic process of finding a consensus in the University 
Senate, in many cases the institutional response overrules any deliberate strategic attempts. 
Nonetheless, an institutional change seems to take place within HU through which an 
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increased acceptance and support of a more strategic leadership has emerged. The 
strengthened leadership in turn seems to have received more authority to implement deliberate 
strategies in certain areas, as long as it is not violating the status quo too much. This 
development has already begun before the Excellence Initiative but seems to have been 
accelerated by the application process in the three rounds. 
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6 Conclusion 
The central focus of this thesis is on strategic behavior that is taking place in higher education 
institutions. By investigating the changes that have been taking place in Humboldt University 
Berlin it was possible to uncover a variety of developments in internal governance, 
organization, human resource policies and research of the university, thereby addressing the 
first research question “(1) Which organizational changes took place within the university 
after the introduction of the Excellence Initiative?”. The findings indicate that the Excellence 
Initiative had a clear impact on the university’s strategic behavior. For example, it has led to 
the creation of an official institutional strategy document. As claimed by several respondents 
this would not have happened without the Excellence Initiative. Moreover, the common goal 
of succeeding in the competition helped legitimizing the strengthening of single strategic 
actors like the university leadership and the deans, a development which suddenly was less 
contested by the University Senate that had originally shown strong resistance against the 
emergence of top-down authority. It can therefore be said that in the case of HU the policy 
instrument Excellence Initiative has reached its goal of making universities more strategic by 
strengthening the university leadership (Gaehtgens, 2010). In addition, the establishment of 
Integrative Research Centers and the centrally distributed funding lines of the Institutional 
Strategy helped to reduce the fragmentation of the institution, which was another intention of 
the Excellence Initiative. In general, it was noticeable in the interviews that the sense of 
competition and the desire of being one of the best universities in Germany have become even 
more present within HU, which can also be seen as an intended outcome of the Excellence 
Initiative. HU is a special case insofar as it had failed in the first two attempts of the 
Excellence Initiative, which created great dissonance within the institution, as its reputation of 
being one of the best universities in Germany was being threatened. This seems to have 
triggered competitiveness in the heads of the university members as well as a willingness to 
invest more time into tasks that are not only beneficial to themselves but to the whole 
institution.  
The findings clearly indicate that strategic behavior is possible in universities which can 
therefore be considered strategic actors. However, regarding the second research question 
“(2)What role does the institutional leadership play in triggering those changes?” it is 
important to point out that, despite several accounts of strategic behavior, HU is not acting as 
an organizational entity with a leadership deciding top-down which directions the university 
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should take. Instead, HU seems to operate like a portfolio manager, who decides to make 
strategic investments in particular project teams which then are relatively autonomous and 
develop their own goals and ways of reaching them (Whitley, 2008). Examples of such 
project teams are the Integrative Research Centers, the Excellence Clusters and the Graduate 
Schools. In order to understand the role of the institutional leadership, it is interesting to 
examine in which way strategic planning is understood in HU. In this context it is important 
to mention that the concept of strategies is still a rather new one in German universities and is 
often discussed controversially. As suggested by Berthold (2011) this could be due to the fact 
that the differentiation process has not yet advanced very far in Germany and individual 
institutions don’t see their survival to be existentially jeopardized by the increased 
competition. However, the findings of this thesis indicate that this process seems to have 
advanced further and against the backdrop of decreasing government funding the need to plan 
strategically has become more urgent. Indeed, the atmosphere during the interviews left the 
impression that the university was getting ready for even more competitive times and the 
Institutional Strategy was seen as a first step into this direction. In fact, many respondents 
considered the increased strategic planning and the strengthening of the leadership a 
necessary development in order to stay successful and the Excellence Initiative was 
considered an important wake-up call for HU. The Institutional Strategy is at the core of this 
strategic planning process and it is of an interpretive nature, as it helps the leadership to 
convey meaning that is intended to motivate stakeholders in a favorable way for the university 
(Maassen & Potman, 1990).  The DFG template provided for the Institutional Strategy has 
encouraged the perception of the strategy being of interpretive nature. In the first part the 
university was supposed to give a description of its status quo and its strengths and 
weaknesses, followed by a section about the actual strategic measures the university intends 
to implement in order to further develop these strengths and to improve the weaknesses. As 
pointed out by a respondent, HU’s Institutional Strategy has indeed managed to represent the 
university’s identity in its whole and the ability to identify with the strategy seems to have a 
very positive effect on the staff member’s willingness to support the strategic measures. 
Moreover, the Institutional Strategy does not only convey meaning to internal stakeholders, 
but it also provides a publicly accessible document that explains the reasons why HU has the 
right to be granted several million Euro, thereby convincing external stakeholders of its 
legitimacy. 
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Addressing the third and final research question of “(3)To what extent are these changes 
influenced by institutional forces?”, it has become clear that the strategic responses are being 
limited by several institutional forces. First, autonomy and self-regulation in decision-making 
processes and the execution of tasks is traditionally strong among HU academics. This is 
reflected in the extent to what most decisions are dependent on a consensus in the University 
Senate. It has also been this bottom-heavy governance structure that has slowed down the 
organizational responses to the Excellence Initiative, resulting in the unsuccessful 
participation in the first two rounds. It was mentioned several times in the interviews that the 
time between the first official announcement of the policy instrument in July 2005 and the 
first application deadline in October 2005 was too short in order for HU to successfully 
develop an Institutional Strategy that was based on university-wide consensus. In the face of 
this time constraint, a draft was developed by a small number of members of the leadership, 
which retrospectively was identified as the main reason for the failure, as the draft met strong 
resistance within the institution due to its top-down nature. Moreover, this resistance was 
explained by pointing out the strong status-quo orientation of the HU University Senate which 
generally needs a lot of persuading in order to accept suggested changes. Further examples of 
institutional forces that have influenced the outcomes of the Excellence Initiative are the 
strong labor regulations that have limited the strategic behavior with regards to human 
resource policies. It was mentioned by a respondent, that in order for the Excellence Initiative 
to really improve the situation of junior academics in Germany, it would have been necessary 
to reform the labor laws in higher education sector at the same time. However, another 
example shows that flexibilization of external regulations do not necessarily lead to changes 
or increased strategic responses within the university. When the Federal Pension Law was 
reformed and German universities were granted the possibility to base professorial salaries on 
performance, HU did not adapt to this change. This choice was explained by the institutional 
tradition of basing the relationship between university and its professor on trust. This example 
shows clearly the strength of institutional traditions at HU and in which ways reform 
outcomes can be influenced by them. By analyzing the identified changes according to 
Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic behavior, it became clear that both deliberate and 
emergent strategies could be observed in the university. Some changes were not seen as 
strategies while they emerged, but only in the aftermath were they identifiable as a slowly 
emerging strategic response that had been triggered by a variety of institutional forces. This 
includes changes in the identity of the institution and the attitude of university members 
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against certain topics such as the Excellence Initiative or the role of leadership. However, 
there have been several deliberate attempts of changing the environment and to adapt to 
external pressures. As to be expected in an institutionalized environment, some of those 
attempts were met with strong resistance. Nonetheless, some of those deliberate strategies 
were successful, especially when they took into considerations the institutional norms and 
were building on the consensus of the whole institution. After the initial failure in the 
Excellence Initiative, the third round was for example met with a deliberate approach of 
providing a functional division of competence among the internal stakeholders. This goes in 
line with former findings that have shown that change within institutions might be the product 
of strategic choices of an identifiable group of leaders while at the same time change can also 
be strongly determined by environmental processes of competitive selection (Gornitzka et al., 
2007). Moreover, one can assume that the pace and depth of organizational adaptation will 
vary considerably according to the openness a higher education institution has demonstrated 
towards its social environment in the past. Especially universities whose institutional history 
have mainly been defined by a sense of elitism and concern with purity, as is the case with 
HU, are typically incorporating new institutional elements in a much slower and more 
superficial way (Krücken & Meier, 2006).  
To fully understand the findings, it is interesting to investigate the reasons of why HU 
participated in the Excellence Initiative. This can be explained by several aspects: First, HU 
felt pressured to live up to its reputation of being one of the best universities in Germany. 
Second, the difficult funding situation in Berlin seemed to leave no other option than to apply 
for the additional money that was perceived essential for staying competitive and keeping up 
the high standards. However, the attempt of HU to compete successfully in the Excellence 
Initiative was not only driven by financial benefits, but also by the fact that a successful 
application provides the university with a firmer societal standing. In other words the 
university is looking for a legitimate position in the societal and political order by finding 
ways to explain and justify its institutional rules and principles, thereby giving policy makers 
and the general public good reasons to accept the institution’s claims to protect its core 
institutional values such as university autonomy or academic freedom (Gornitzka et al., 
2007). This search for a new pact should be seen as part of a much larger transformation that 
is happening, as Europe in general is currently in search of a new order (Gornitzka et al., 
2007). The changes that took place due to the Excellence Initiative can therefore be perceived 
to be at the core of the current change processes that are happening in Europe and in particular 
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in European higher education. In order to be able to meet the societal and economic demands, 
it is important that universities are well integrated in society and responding flexible and fast 
enough to the rapid changes that are taking place in their environment (Gornitzka et al., 
2007). In general, the Excellence Initiative seems to have served its purpose. However, the 
extent to which those changes are sustainable is very dependent on several political decisions. 
It seems likely that some of the changes will not be able to be maintained after the Excellence 
Initiative funding ends in 2018, unless a more permanent solution is found that provides 
higher and steadier funding to German universities. Another competition in the form of a 
fourth round of the Excellence Initiative is currently being discussed. However, one needs to 
consider the large amount of time and manpower that was spent during the application 
process both in the successful and the unsuccessful universities. While this investment has 
undeniably sparked many positive changes in the first rounds, it is questionable if this extent 
of mobilization would take place another time. Therefore many critiques claim that the 
outcomes of another round would not justify the immense efforts and investments of the 
application process anymore.  
In general this case study has contributed to the literature on the impacts of the Excellence 
Initiative. While this thesis provided insight into strategic behavior in universities based on a 
single case study, it would be interesting to continue the research by investigating and 
comparing the responses of further universities. It is likely that the types of responses vary 
dependent on the institutional traditions and available resources. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to examine the strategic responses in universities that have been unsuccessful in 
the Excellence Initiative. To conclude, it is important to follow up the developments in the 
strategic behavior of German universities in the future and to conduct more empirical research 
on the effects strategic behavior has on the performance and quality of the institutions. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Example interview guideline 
1. Personal information 
1.1. Position at Humboldt University 
1.2. Contact with Excellence Initiative 
2. Changes in internal organization and governance 
2.1. Changes within department or faculty since 2005? In how far has Excellence Initiative 
had impact?  
2.2. Changes within governance structures and procedures since 2005? 
2.3. Change in importance and procedures of strategic planning since 2005? 
2.4. Actors that are most important in process of strategic planning? Changed since 2005?  
2.5. What are the reasons for those actors to have influence and how has it developed ober 
time? 
3. Changes in research 
3.1. Changes in research profile of department/faculty since 2005? Who has initiated those 
changes and why? 
3.2. Are there incentives that are supposed to direct the research profile (e.g. more 
interdisciplinary research)? Changes since 2005? 
3.3. Changes in third-party funding of department/faculty since 2005?  
3.4. Are there incentives to apply for third-party funding? Changes since 2005? 
4. Changes in human resource policies 
4.1. Changes in personnel structures within department/faculty since 2005?  
4.2. Changes in appointment and recruitment procedures since 2005?  
4.3. Changes in human resource planning within department/faculty since 2005? Has it 
become more strategic?  
4.4. Changes in contracts, regulations or frameworks since 2005?  
5. Application to Excellence Initiative 
5.1. How have the applications been developed and prepared within HU? Who was involved? 
5.2. In how far have the formalities influenced the content of the applications? 
5.3. How has the failure in the first two rounds influenced the third application? 
5.4. Based on your opinion which changes have been directly triggered by Excellence 
Initiative?  
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Appendix 2: Application and selection procedure Excellence Initiative 
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Appendix 3: Assessment criteria for Institutional Strategy 
Status Quo of University 
Research achievements a) in the university’s profile areas of research activity 
b) in the university’s other areas of research activity 
Institutional setting for 
top researchers at every 
career level 
a) Structures and processes of research organization 
b) Infrastructure 
c) Advancement of young researchers 
d) Recruitment procedures 
e) Internationalization and international visibility 
f) Gender equality 
g) External collaborations 
Research-oriented 
teaching  
(only if a concept for research-oriented teaching was submitted) 
Capacity to act 
 
a) Institutional capability for structurally differentiated self-
assessment of the university 
b) Institutional capability for strategy development and profile 
shaping 
c) Governance 
d) Internal communication processes 
Quality of Institutional Strategy 
Plausibility  
 
of the Institutional Strategy in view of the goals of the funding 
programme and 
the Status Quo 
Coherence  Coherence of the Institutional Strategy regarding targets, 
strategic approach and measures 
Innovative potential  Innovative potential of the measures 
Effects on teaching 
 
a) of the proposed measures to expand top-level research: 
positive effects and possible 
unintended side effects 
b) of the proposed concept for research-oriented teaching (if 
such was submitted) 
Project organization and 
management  
Both at executive and operational levels 
Adequacy of the proposed 
budget  
Adequacy of the proposed budget to meet institutional goals 
Potential of University to become sustainably excellent 
Sustainability  Integration of the Institutional Strategy in the university’s long-
term planning 
 
Foreseeable effects of the Institutional Strategy for the 
sustained expansion of top-level 
research at the university (including effects on teaching), at the 
location, and on the system 
of higher education and research 
 
International 
Competitiveness 
Likelihood that the university will improve its international 
competitiveness 
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Appendix 4: Outcomes for Humboldt University (including medical school Charité) 
Round  Institutional 
Strategy 
Graduate School Excellence Cluster 
First 
round 
(2006-
2011) 
Applied 
with draft? 
Yes, 1 draft was 
handed in 
Yes, 7 drafts were 
handed in 
Yes, 3 drafts were 
handed in 
Draft short-
listed? 
No, draft was 
not short-listed 
Yes, 2 draft were 
short-listed 
Yes, 2 drafts were 
short-listed 
Success in 
final 
decision? 
No Yes, 2 drafts were 
successful 
Berlin School of 
Mind and Brain 
Berlin Mathematical 
School 
No 
Second 
round 
(2007-
2012) 
Applied 
with draft? 
Yes, 1 draft was 
handed in 
Yes, 7 drafts were 
handed in 
Yes, 4 draftswere 
handed in 
Draft short-
listed? 
Yes, draft was 
short-listed 
Yes, 4 drafts were 
short-listed 
Yes, 3 drafts were 
short-listed 
Success in 
final 
decision? 
No, draft was 
finally rejected 
Yes, 2 drafts were 
successful 
Berlin Brandenburg 
School for 
Regenerative 
Therapies, Medicine 
Berlin Graduate 
School of Social 
Sciences 
Yes, 2 drafts were 
successful 
NeuroCure, Medicine 
Topoi, Philosophy 
Third 
round 
(2012-
2017) 
Applied 
with draft? 
Yes, 1 draft was 
handed in 
Yes, 8 drafts were 
handed in (4 new and 
4 follow-up) 
Yes, 9 drafts were 
handed in (7 new and 
2 follow-up) 
Draft short-
listed? 
Yes, draft was 
short-listed 
Yes, 8 drafts were 
short-listed (out of 
which 3 were the 
schools already 
successful in round 1 
and 2) 
Yes, 4 drafts were 
short-listed (out of 
which 2 were the 
clusters already 
successful in round 2) 
Success in 
final 
decision? 
Yes, 
Institutional 
Strategy was 
successful 
Yes, 5 drafts were 
successful: 
Berlin School of 
Mind and Brain 
(continued) 
Berlin Brandenburg 
School for 
Regenerative 
Yes, 3 drafts were 
successful 
NeuroCure 
(continued) 
Topoi (continued) 
Image Knowledge 
Gestaltung (new) 
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Therapies 
(continued) 
Berlin Mathematical 
School (continued) 
Graduate School for 
Analytical Science 
Adlershof (new) 
Berlin Graduate 
School for Integrative 
Oncology (new) 
 
 
